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INTRODUCTION	After	the	American	Civil	War,	three	ex-officers	of	the	Confederate	army	stood	trial	for	“violations	of	the	laws	and	customs	of	war”—for	murdering	or	murderously	neglecting	Union	prisoners	of	war.	Captain	Henry	Wirz,	a	prison	commandant,	was	convicted	and	hung	in	November	1865.	The	other	two	were	acquitted	in	January	and	June	of	1866:	Brigadier	(one-star)	General	Hugh	Mercer	and	a	second	prison	commandant,	Major	John	Gee.	These	are	likely	the	first	war	crimes	trials	in	modern	history.1	For	each,	there	exists	a	more	or	less	verbatim	transcript	of	the	proceedings.	Very	few	scholars	have	studied	these	documents,	and	always	in	isolation.	Weighing	all	I	find	against	the	existing	explanations	for	how	and	why	federal	prosecutors	brought	these	charges	to	court,	I	attempt	the	first	ever	analysis	of	all	three	transcripts	together.	These	were	political	trials.	No	accepted	legal	machinery	was	then	in	place	that	would	have,	as	a	matter	of	routine,	without	the	prompting	or	approval	of	political	authorities,	arraigned	and	passed	judgment	on	commissioned	officers	of	an	enemy	army.	There	was	no	clear	precedent	for	it.	To	the	contrary,	the	convention	was	to	grant	such	officers	immunity.	What	was	it	that	motivated	the	prosecutors	to	defy	this	convention?	What	legal	hurdles	and	counter-motives	obstructed	their	work,	such	that	only	three	officers	of	middling	authority	ultimately	came	to	court?	Originally,	in	the	first	months	after	the	close	of	open	warfare	in	April	1865,	federal	prosecutors	planned	to	bring	dozens	of	former	Confederate	officials	to	court.	My	focus	here	is	on	war	crimes—one	route	of	legal	action	against	these	officials.	War	crimes	prosecutions	were	built	on	the	premise	that	the	Confederates,	while	authorized	to	fight,	had	overstepped	the	limits	of	humane	warfare	set	by	international	law.	As	these	limits	were	codified	and	enforced	by	U.S.	military	authorities,	the	prosecutions	were	destined	for	military	tribunals.	Treason	prosecutions,	the	other	main	route	of	legal	action,	treated	the	conflict	within	a	domestic	framework.	In	these,	which	were	destined	for	civilian	courts,	prosecutors	
																																																								1	Gerry	J.	Simpson,	Law,	war	and	crime:	war	crimes	trials	and	the	reinvention	of	
international	law	(Cambridge:	Polity,	2007),	178.	
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sought	to	prove	that	Southerners	had	had	no	right	to	wage	war	at	all—that	in	seceding,	they	had	committed	a	high	crime	against	their	own	country.	Treason	concerned	the	Confederate	cause,	war	crimes	their	character	in	battle.	Together,	they	held	out	the	opportunity	for	a	post-mortem	of	the	rebellion,	a	chance	to	publicly	revisit	the	war	and—if	federal	prosecutors	were	successful—to	assign	blame	for	its	devastation	to	the	former	leaders	of	the	Confederacy.	The	federal	government	was	tasked	with	reabsorbing	a	pseudo-state	of	roughly	9	million	people,	more	than	a	third	of	them	ex-slaves.2	The	ability	to	reunite	a	broken	country	and	dismantle	the	slave	system,	as	Union	leaders	promised,	rested	upon	the	support	of	Northern	voters	and	the	submission	of	ex-Confederates.	Assigning	blame	and	producing	moral	narratives	of	the	war	were	seen	as	crucial	to	this	support.	While	courts	were	potentially	valuable	here,	the	decision	to	entrust	them	with	producing	narratives	came	with	a	set	of	risks	for	federal	prosecutors.	When	courts	assigned	blame	and	meted	out	punishments,	they	did	so	credibly.	But	to	the	extent	they	were	credible,	they	had	to	remain	autonomous.	There	was	no	simple	way	of	assuring	that	the	facts	dug	up	in	court	and	the	verdicts	given	would	discredit	the	former	Confederacy,	as	the	prosecutors	intended.	Scalpel	in	hand,	the	Confederate	body	laid	before	them,	federal	prosecutors	got	squeamish.	Treason	charges	never	came	to	court,	largely	out	of	prosecutors’	fear	of	acquittal.3	War	crimes	prosecutors	faced	similar	inhibitions.	At	first,	in	the	Wirz	trial,	they	overcame	them.	But	the	acquittals	of	Mercer	and	Gee	in	1866	proved	that	bringing	charges	could	backfire,	functioning	to	exonerate	Confederate	leaders	in	the	public	eye.	On	top	of	that,	internal	opposition	to	their	work	was	mounting,	from	legal	and	military	authorities	as	well	as	from	President	Johnson.	While	the	Mercer	and	Gee	trials	were	underway,	war	crimes	prosecutors	were	attempting	to	arraign																																																									2	According	to	the	1860	census.	For	estimates	of	Confederate	war	losses,	see	J.	David	Hacker,	"A	census-based	count	of	the	civil	war	dead,"	Civil	War	History	57	(2011).	3	Cynthia	Nicoletti	has	brought	this	to	light	in	regard	to	the	failed	prosecution	of	Jefferson	Davis,	the	prospective	test	case	for	treason.	An	acquittal	would	have	been	equivalent	to	a	ruling	that	secession	had	been	legal.	Cynthia	Nicoletti,	Secession	on	
trial:	the	treason	prosecution	of	Jefferson	Davis,	Studies	in	legal	history,	(New	York,	NY:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017),	6-8.	
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Major	(two-star)	General	George	Pickett,	who	would	have	been	the	most	prominent	ex-Confederate	to	face	war	crimes	charges.	However,	in	light	of	weakening	confidence	among	supporters	and	growing	assertiveness	among	opponents,	Pickett	was	never	formally	charged,	signaling	a	premature	close	to	war	crimes	prosecutions	in	mid-1866.		In	the	first	section	of	this	paper,	before	dealing	with	each	trial	in	detail,	I	turn	to	existing	explanations	for	how	these	legal	events	came	to	pass.	These	explanations	center	on	the	trial	of	Wirz,	the	prison	camp	commandant	who	was	convicted	and	hung	in	November	1865.	My	goal	here	is	to	engage	with	the	scholarship	on	Wirz	and	to	re-contextualize	this	trial	alongside	Mercer,	Gee,	and	the	failed	prosecution	of	Pickett,	all	of	which	belong	to	the	same	category	of	post-war	legal	action.4	Within	the	body	of	work	on	Wirz	over	the	past	century,	I	identify	two	major	lineages	within	professional	scholarship.	They	constitute	lineages	in	that	they	cite	each	other	heavily	and	work	within	a	similar	set	of	assumptions	and	methods.	Jurists	and	historians	who	have	evaluated	Wirz	as	a	legal	precedent	I	call	the	“legalist”	lineage.	These	scholars	have	tended	to	ignore	the	politics	behind	the	trial	and	affirm	the	original	narrative	promoted	by	Wirz’s	prosecutors.	The	other	lineage,	which	I	call	“revisionist,”	has	attacked	this	narrative.5	They	attempt	to	show	that	the																																																									4	On	my	definition	of	this	category,	which	excludes	the	prosecution	of	the	Lincoln	assassins,	of	guerrillas,	and	of	petty	offenders,	see	the	Appendix.	5	Works	of	this	lineage	include:	William	Best	Hesseltine,	Civil	war	prisons;	a	study	in	
war	psychology	(Columbus,	Ohio:	The	Ohio	State	University	Press,	1930);	James	C	Bonner,	"War	Crimes	Trials,	1865-1867,"	International	Social	Science	Review	22,	no.	2	(1947);	Darrett	B	Rutman,	"The	War	Crimes	and	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,"	Civil	War	
History	6,	no.	2	(1960);	Hesseltine,	Civil	war	prisons.	Lewis	L	Laska	and	James	M	Smith,	"'Hell	and	the	Devil':	Andersonville	and	the	Trial	of	Captain	Henry	Wirz,	CSA,	1865,"	Mil.	L.	Rev.	68	(1975);	Glen	W	LaForce,	"The	Trial	of	Major	Henry	Wirz—A	National	Disgrace,"	Army	Law.		(1988);	William	Marvel,	Andersonville:	The	last	depot	(Univ	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1994);	Edward	F	Roberts,	Andersonville	Journey	(White	Mane	Publishing	Company,	1998);	Robert	Scott	Davis,	Ghosts	and	Shadows	of	
Andersonville:	Essays	on	the	Secret	Social	Histories	of	America's	Deadliest	Prison	(Mercer	University	Press,	2006);	Ruedi	Studer,	Der	Prozess	gegen	Captain	Henry	
Wirz	und	seine	Hintergründe	1865	(Traugott	Bautz,	2006);	William	Marvel,	Lincoln's	
Autocrat:	The	Life	of	Edwin	Stanton	(UNC	Press	Books,	2015).	A	recent	book	on	Wirz	
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trial	was	a	legal	farce—a	perversion	of	law	by	politics.	While	the	legalist	and	revisionist	depictions	of	Wirz	appear	to	be	diametrical	opposites,	they	are	similar	in	that	they	have	both	avoided	close	engagement	with	the	trial	transcript.	They	also	hinge	upon	a	similar	binary	of	law	and	politics:	law	is	assumed	to	be	an	ideal	space	that	only	functions	in	the	absence	of	political	influence.	My	own	explanatory	model,	which	I	lay	out	in	the	following	section,	revolves	around	a	concept	of	the	political	trial	that	treats	legal	and	political	systems	as	co-constitutive	rather	than	mutually	exclusive.	Whereas	revisionist	historians	of	Wirz	(whose	narrative	has	come	to	dominate	historical	discourse)	invoke	“political”	as	a	kind	of	slander,	my	analysis	confronts	the	fact	that	these	trials	as	well	as	their	
prevention	were	political	by	default—that	the	underlying	legal	questions	at	play	were	also	political	questions.	I	structure	my	explanation	of	the	trials	in	terms	of	their	interwoven	legal	and	political	contexts.	On	the	legal	side,	I	attempt	to	explain	how	prosecutors	overcame	the	post-war	convention	of	criminal	immunity	for	enemy	officials.	Essential	to	their	success	was	the	fact	that,	over	the	course	of	the	Civil	War,	the	legal	institutions	of	the	federal	army	had	grown	to	unheard-of	proportions.	Recently,	a	number	of	Civil	War	legal	historians	have	unwrapped	this	institutional	development	and	located	the	issue	of	war	crimes	within	it.		On	the	political	side,	I	introduce	the	concept	of	the	“didactic	trial,”	or	a	trial	intended	to	influence	public	opinion	and	memory.	On	the	one	hand,	prosecutors	intended	Wirz	to	wreck	the	moral	standing	of	the	former	Confederate	leadership.	On	the	other,	these	prosecutions	were	part	of	the	effort	to	publicly	advertise	the	military	legal	institutions	mentioned	above	as	tools	to	enforce	Reconstruction.	The	jurisdictional	question	of	whether	war	crimes	tribunals	could	be	constituted	in	the	first	place	involved	more	than	interpreting	the	Constitution	or	the	law	of	nations.	It																																																																																																																																																																						that	would	belong	here	was	shelved	by	U.	of	Tennessee	Press	after	it	was	alleged	that	the	author	plagiarized	Marvel’s	The	Last	Depot.	R	Fred	Ruhlman,	Captain	Henry	
Wirz	and	Andersonville	Prison:	A	Reappraisal	(University	of	Tennessee	Press,	2006);	"Plagiarism	Accusation	Shelves	Civil	War	Book	Just	Out	From	U.	of	Tennessee	Press,"		The	Chronicle	of	Higher	Education	(2006).	https://www.chronicle.com/article/Plagiarism-Accusation-Shelves/37845.	
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was	directly	caught	up	in	debates	over	the	respective	power	of	state-level	civil	authorities	and	federal	military	authorities,	the	former	trying	to	resist	and	the	latter	trying	to	implement	sweeping	reforms	to	Southern	society.	These	political	overtones	help	to	explain	why	opposition	to	war	crimes	trials	from	was	so	vigorous,	and	I	finish	the	section	with	a	sketch	of	where	this	opposition	came	from.	After	offering	these	correctives,	I	dive	into	Wirz.	The	defendant	was	the	commandant	at	Andersonville,	which	had	more	fatalities	than	any	other	Civil	War	prison	camp.	In	addition	to	alleging	a	number	of	individual	murders,	prosecutors	set	out	to	prove	that	the	overall	death	rate	resulted	from	a	homicidal	conspiracy	between	Wirz	and	higher-ranking	officials.	I	begin	the	section	with	a	discussion	of	jurisdiction.	The	defense	tried	to	derail	the	proceedings	by	invoking	the	Constitution	and	the	Sherman-Johnston	surrender	agreement.	A	fragile	set	of	circumstances—for	one,	the	war	was	officially	still	in	progress—allowed	the	prosecutors	to	weather	these	challenges	and	transgress	the	convention	of	immunity.	The	second	subsection	is	devoted	to	the	intended	didactic	function	of	the	proceedings.	I	show	that	the	best	explanation	for	Wirz’s	verdict	lies	in	the	strength	of	the	prosecutor's	case	as	opposed	to	any	legal	foul	play.	This	is	important	because	the	trial	was	intended	to	showcase	due	process	and,	by	extension,	the	military	commission	as	a	legal	forum.	All	the	same,	the	investigation	of	a	conspiracy	beyond	Wirz’s	personal	culpability	introduced	biases	into	the	proceedings	that	undermined	the	court’s	claim	to	fairness.	This	investigation,	enabled	by	the	special	procedural	rules	of	the	military	commission,	was	central	to	the	prosecutors’	didactic	intentions.	I	finish	the	section	with	an	explanation	for	why	prosecutors	selected	the	POW	crisis,	a	set	of	primarily	white-on-white	crimes,	as	their	point	of	didactic	emphasis.		After	Wirz,	I	discuss	the	border	case	of	Gen.	George	Pickett,	whose	investigation	took	place	in	the	background	of	Mercer	and	Gee.	Pickett	was	suspected	of	brutally	executing	over	twenty	Union	POWs.	In	the	end,	he	was	never	arraigned.		Among	the	leaders	behind	these	prosecutions,	there	are	two	in	particular	to	keep	in	mind:	Judge	Advocate	General	Joseph	Holt,	who	oversaw	the	U.S.	military	court	system,	and	Secretary	of	War	Edwin	Stanton,	to	whom	Holt	reported.	The	ultimate	failure	to	bring	charges	against	Pickett	resulted	from	the	hesitation	of	Holt	
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and	Stanton	in	the	face	of	a	potential	acquittal	as	well	as	mounting	jurisdictional	challenges.	Their	hesitation	underlines	the	fact	that	these	men	understood	war	crimes	trials	as	legitimate	legal	processes	that	could	not	be	puppeteered	from	backstage.	This	does	not	mean	their	actions	were	apolitical;	it	means	that	they	were	constrained	by	the	legal	instruments	they	employed.	Ultimately,	the	high	bar	that	prosecutors	set	for	themselves	aided	those	who	sought	to	prevent	such	trials	altogether.	In	Pickett’s	case,	the	crucial	opposition	came	from	Gen.	Ulysses	Grant,	a	figure	who	railroaded	several	other	key	prosecutions.	After	Pickett,	I	move	on	to	the	two	acquittals,	that	of	Hugh	Mercer,	a	brigadier	general	accused	of	unlawfully	ordering	seven	executions,	and	John	Gee,	the	commandant	of	the	prisoner	of	war	camp	at	Salisbury—a	case	similar	in	its	outlines	to	Wirz.	The	full	transcripts	for	these	trials	were	rediscovered	and	reprinted	quite	recently,6	which	is	one	reason	they’ve	eluded	scholarship	for	so	long.	The	acquittals	highlight	the	risks	that	the	prosecutors	brought	upon	themselves	by	taking	these	charges	to	court.	A	look	at	the	transcript	of	Mercer	reveals	that	the	defense	did	not	stop	at	demolishing	the	prosecution’s	case	in	terms	of	evidence;	they	effectively	used	to	the	trial	to	promote	counter-narratives	of	the	POW	crisis	and	polemics	against	Union	leaders.	
Gee	began	in	February	1866,	the	month	after	Mercer	ended.	The	aspect	of	this	trial	that	I	most	want	to	emphasize—beyond	the	fact	that	Gee’s	defense	team,	like	Mercer’s,	wrecked	the	prosecution—is	how	the	trial	embodies	a	political	retreat	from	war	crimes	prosecutions	that	had	begun	some	months	before.	In	the	midst	of	the	trial,	President	Johnson	intervened	to	cripple	the	jurisdiction	of	military	courts,	which	led	to	a	brief	interruption	of	Gee’s	trial	and	an	unusual	showdown	of	civilian	and	military	legal	authorities.	The	debate	over	the	constitutionality	of	military	courts	had	become	a	proxy	for	the	struggle	between	federal	and	local	visions	of	Reconstruction—between	militarily	enforced	reforms	and	the	restoration	of	an																																																									6	Annette	Gee	Ford,	The	captive:	Major	John	H.	Gee,	commandant	of	the	Confederate	
Prison	at	Salisbury,	North	Carolina,	1864-1865:	a	biographical	sketch	with	complete	
court-martial	transcript	(2000);	Norman	Vincent	Turner,	"Confederate	Military	Executions	at	Savannah,	Georgia	during	the	Civil	War,	which	led	to	the	trial	of	Brigadier	General	Hugh	W.	Mercer,"	Unpub,	Historical	Effingham	Society		(2007).	
	 7	
antebellum	status	quo—and	the	showdown	in	Gee	was	a	microcosm	of	that	struggle.	Though	the	trial	eventually	continued	without	further	interference,	the	active	opposition	of	the	president	and	legal	authorities—not	to	mention	a	second	defeat	for	prosecutors—signaled	that	the	project	of	war	crimes	prosecution	was	at	an	end.	I	conclude	with	some	thoughts	on	the	legacy	of	these	early	war	crimes	trials	and	the	attempts	of	recent	historians	to	associate	themselves	either	with	the	prosecutors	or	with	their	opponents.	For	pro-prosecution	historians,	this	attempt	seems	to	derive	from	an	ethical	commitment	to	defending	Reconstruction;	for	anti-prosecution	historians,	from	a	stated	commitment	to	defending	civil	liberties.	In	contrast,	my	own	analysis	indicates	that	there	is	no	straightforward	way	to	translate	these	ethical	commitments	into	a	retrospective	stance	on	the	trials	in	question.		
LITERATURE	AND	METHODOLOGY	
I.	Historiography	of	Wirz	In	this	section	I	summarize	and	critique	the	existing	scholarship	on	Wirz.	The	literature	is	nearly	silent	on	Mercer	and	Gee,	thus	the	work	on	Wirz	holds	out	the	principle	narratives	to	contend	with.	I	identify	two	narrative	and	methodological	tendencies	(or	“lineages”)	in	this	body	of	work,	which	I	have	labeled	“legalist”	and	“revisionist”—the	former	promoting	and	the	latter	condemning	Wirz’s	prosecution.		
I.I.	The	Legalist	Lineage	Lawrence	Rockwood	wrote	in	2007	that	regardless	of	criticisms	of	the	Wirz	trial,	“the	doctrinal	significance	of	such	cases	for	the	American	military	profession	is	not	
diminished.	Seven	out	of	eight	of	the	military	panel	that	convicted	and	sentenced	Wirz	to	be	hanged	were	general	officers.	The	secretary	of	war	and	the	president	as	commander-in-chief	upheld	both	the	conviction	and	the	sentence.”7	This	line	of	
																																																								7	Italics	in	original.	Lawrence	Rockwood,	Walking	away	from	Nuremberg	:	just	war	
and	the	doctrine	of	command	responsibility	(Amherst:	University	of	Massachusetts	Press,	2007),	44.	
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thinking	underpins	what	I	call	the	“legalist”	lineage	of	Wirz	historiography.8	That	the	trial	occurred	and	that	it	resulted	in	state-sanctioned	violence	covers	the	criteria	for	precedential	validity—all	that	remains	is	an	explication	of	the	court’s	rationale.9	Handling	Wirz	as	a	precedent	in	this	way	works	to	validate	the	narrative	that	Wirz	was	a	confirmed	war	criminal	and	that	his	trial	was	both	necessary	and	legitimate.	Perhaps	the	most	important	works	of	this	lineage	emerged	from	the	post-World	War	I	era,	when	Wirz’s	relevance	as	a	legal	precedent	reached	its	peak.10	In	search	of	a	legal	basis	for	bringing	charges	against	German	leaders,	the	United	States	delegation	to	the	1919	Commission	on	Responsibilities	cited	Wirz	as	the	jurisdictional	precedent	for	doing	so.11	They	argued	that	German	offenders	must	be	tried	in	domestic	military	tribunals	constituted	by	the	specific	country	that	had	fallen	victim	to	the	offense,	much	as	the	federal	government	had	tried	Wirz,	an	officer	of	the	enemy	forces,	after	the	Civil	War.12	Another	way	that	legalist	scholars	have	preserved	Wirz	as	a	precedent	is	by	editing	and	publishing	reprints	of	the	trial	transcript,	cutting	out	large	portions	in	order	to	reduce	the	original	800-page	transcript	to	a	manageable	length.	The	reprint	that	is	most	cited	by	scholars	of	the	past	century	appears	in	American	State	Trials,																																																									8	Such	analyses	derive	from	a	view	of	law	as	a	self-contained	web	of	internally	consistent	rules	and	practices,	sealed	off	from	politics	and	historical	particularity.	Here	I	draw	on	Shklar’s	critique	of	Oppenheim	and	Kelson:	Judith	N.	Shklar,	
Legalism	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	Univ.	Press,	1964),	130-1.	9	A	recent	critic	of	Wirz	writes,	“The	Wirz	case	is	another	one	of	those	linear	precedents	often	quoted	when	officials	need	a	formalistic	rationale	that	will	help	them	legitimate	the	use	of	executive	military	commissions."	Marouf	Arif	Hasian,	In	
the	name	of	necessity:	military	tribunals	and	the	loss	of	American	civil	liberties	(Tuscaloosa:	Univ.	of	Alabama	Press,	2012),	118.	10	For	examples	of	references	to	Wirz	from	this	era:	James	F.	Willis,	Prologue	to	
Nuremberg:	the	politics	and	diplomacy	of	punishing	war	criminals	of	the	First	World	
War	(Westport,	Conn.:	Greenwood	Press,	1982),	46.	11	In	their	“Memorandum	of	Reservations,”	the	U.S.	delegates	wrote	that	they	“had	especially	in	mind	the	case	of	Henry	Wirz,”	who	“was	tried	by	a	military	commission,	sitting	in	the	city	of	Washington,	for	crimes	contrary	to	the	laws	and	customs	of	war,	convicted	thereof,	sentenced	to	be	executed,	and	actually	executed	on	the	11th	November,	1865.”	Robert	Lansing	and	James	Brown	Scott,	"Memorandum	of	Reservations	Presented	by	the	Representatives	of	the	United	States	to	the	Report	of	the	Commission	on	Responsibilities,"	Am.	J.	Int’l	L.	14	(1920):	142.	12	Ibid,	140-143.	
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Vol.	8.13	What	the	American	State	Trials	abridgment	retains	are	the	charges,	summaries	of	the	defense	and	prosecution	arguments,	relevant	testimonies,	and	the	findings.	What	is	removed	are	most	of	the	exchanges	between	the	judges,	the	prosecutor,	and	the	defense	counsel,	and	these	portions	in	particular	crystalize	the	aspects	of	the	trial	that	distinguish	it	from	ordinary	legal	proceedings.	Crucial	elements	such	as	attacks	on	the	national	loyalty	of	defense	witnesses	or	allegations	by	the	defense	of	witness	intimidation	disappear,	as	do	the	interpersonal	dynamics	of	the	courtroom	in	general.	This	functions	to	cleanse	the	transcript,	rendering	it	serviceable	as	a	precedent	to	be	interpreted	in	a	highly	specific	way,	for	example,	to	determine	the	appropriate	venue	to	try	enemy	officers.	There	is	no	explanation	for	how	a	precedent	suddenly	emerged	where	there	was	none	before.		
I.II.	The	Revisionist	Lineage	The	significance	of	Wirz	as	a	precedent,	and	thus	as	a	topic	for	war	crimes	jurisprudence,	was	gradually	displaced	in	the	20th	century	by	trials	of	greater	magnitude.14	At	the	same	time,	having	persisted	in	pockets	of	the	U.S.	publishing	market,	the	diametrical	opposite	of	the	legalist	lineage	caught	a	second	wind.	I	call	it	“revisionist,”	as	it	takes	aim	at	the	doctrinal	histories	of	Wirz,	portraying	Wirz	instead	as	an	arbitrary	expression	of	political	power.15	Because	this	lineage	has	dominated	the	narrative	of	Wirz	for	generations,	it	requires	the	most	attention.	The	revisionist	lineage	as	a	whole	can	be	traced	back	to	the	points	made	on	behalf	of	Wirz	by	his	counsel	and	echoed	in	the	Democrat-leaning	press	during	the	trial.	All	the	specific	arguments	about	jurisdiction	and	legal	bias	serve	the	following																																																									13	John	D.	Lawson,	American	state	trials;	a	collection	of	the	important	and	interesting	
criminal	trials	which	have	taken	place	in	the	United	States	from	the	beginning	of	our	
government	to	the	present	day,	Vol.	8	(St.	Louis:	Thomas	Law	Books,	1917),	xxiii.	A	popular	textbook	on	war	crimes	law	from	the	1970s	contains	a	further	abridgment	of	the	American	State	Trials	abridgment.	Leon	Friedman,	The	law	of	war:	a	
documentary	history,	Vol.	2	(New	York:	Random	House,	1972),	775.	14	In	particular	the	Nuremberg	and	Tokyo	trials,	where	prosecutors	still	referenced	
Wirz	as	a	precedent.	Joshua	E.	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	war	as	law:	Brigadier	General	
Joseph	Holt	and	the	Judge	Advocate	General's	department	in	the	Civil	War	and	early	
Reconstruction,	1861-1865	(Durham,	N.C.:	Carolina	Academic	Press,	2011),	260.		15	For	a	list	of	revisionist	works:	see	supra	note	5.	
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explanation	for	the	trial’s	occurrence:	Republican	politicians	designed	it	as	a	way	to	appease	the	Northern	public’s	demands	for	vengeance.	This	overarching	scapegoat	narrative,	which	is	consistently	re-articulated	by	the	entire	revisionist	lineage,	was	already	laid	out	in	Wirz’s	closing	statement	at	his	trial.16	After	1865	it	has	passed	through	roughly	75	years	of	non-academic	and	highly	partisan	historiography,17	then	through	roughly	80	years	of	academic	revision	to	the	present	moment.	Hesseltine’s	1930	Civil	war	prisons	marks	the	beginning	of	professional	scholarship	on	the	Wirz	trial	and	on	Civil	War	prisons	generally.18	Performing	a	systematic	analysis	of	Northern	and	Southern	prisons,	Hesseltine	argues—counter	to	the	popular	narrative	produced,	in	part,	by	Wirz’s	prosecutors—that	the	catastrophic	death	rates	in	Southern	camps,	and	in	particular	at	Andersonville,	where	Wirz	was	stationed,	were	not	the	result	of	any	Confederate	plot	to	exterminate	Union	soldiers.	He	argues	that	the	belief	in	such	a	Confederate	plot	was	the	consequence	of	“war	psychosis,”	or	the	tendency	“for	the	supporters	of	one	cause	to	identify	their	entire	personality	with	that	cause,	to	identify	their	opponents	with	the	opposing	cause,	and	to	hate	the	supporters	of	the	enemy	cause	with	a	venom	which	counterbalances	their	devotion	to	their	own.”19	This	bent	of	mind,	he	argues,	together	with	government	propaganda	and	sensationalism	in	the	Northern	press,	formed	a	vicious	circle	that	Hesseltine	carefully	tracks	straight	up	to	the	Wirz	trial,	the	spectacle	to	consummate	this	“psychotic”	drive	for	revenge.20																																																										16	The	transcript	reads,	“I	cannot	believe	that	[the	judges]	stepped	down	from	their	high	positions,	at	the	bidding	of	power,	or	at	the	more	reckless	dictate	of	ignorant,	widespread	prejudice,	to	consign	to	a	felon’s	doom	a	poor	subaltern	officer….”	Trial	
of	Henry	Wirz:	letter	from	the	Secretary	of	War	ad	Interim	in	answer	to	a	resolution	of	
the	House	of	April	16,	1866,	U.S.	40th	Cong.,	2d	sess.	House	Executive	document,	(Washington:	Gov't	print,	1868),	704.	17	Most	of	these	were	“Lost	Cause”	histories,	which	sought	to	blame	the	Union	for	the	humanitarian	disaster	of	Civil	War	prison	camps	and	to	demonstrate	the	virtue	of	the	Confederate	cause.	These	depictions	of	Wirz	responded	in	part	to	the	flood	of	sensationalist	autobiographies	written	by	former	Union	POWs.	See	James	M.	Gillispie,	Andersonvilles	of	the	North:	the	myths	and	realities	of	Northern	treatment	of	
Civil	War	Confederate	prisoners	(Denton,	Texas:	UNT	Press,	2008),	27-45.		18	Gillispie,	Andersonvilles	of	the	North,	58-61.	19	Hesseltine,	Civil	war	prisons,	172.	20	Ibid,	233-239.	
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Though	his	analysis	does	not	delve	deeply	into	the	proceedings,	the	way	Hesseltine	frames	Wirz	has	been	decisive	for	later	revisionists,	who	have	built	upon	his	work	by	stringing	together	evidence	of	foul	play	by	the	judges	and	prosecutor.	In	their	work	to	create	the	impression	of	a	rigged	trial,	one	can	discern	among	them	a	process	of	source-cleansing	that	is	reminiscent	of	the	legalist	historiography,	but	in	reverse.	Instead	of	reducing	Wirz	to	an	apolitical	legal	precedent—charge,	evidence,	finding,	punishment—they	reduce	the	trial	to	a	string	of	political	interferences.	What	follows	in	the	decades	after	Hesseltine	is	a	ballooning	network	of	self-reference,	of	one	revisionist	citing	another	and	following	the	same	core	narrative.	This	process	has	resulted	in	a	loss	of	sensitivity	to	the	original	context	of	the	arguments	that	the	revisionists	reproduce.	When	one	revisionist	pulls	an	argument	from	a	partisan	source	of	the	19th	century	and	it	is	cited	in	turn	by	other	revisionists,	the	argument	is	stripped	of	the	specific	connotations	it	had	for	the	partisans	who	originally	employed	it.21	Another	result	has	been	the	extent	to	which	revisionists	neglect	the	trial	transcript.	With	her	1995	dissertation,	Gayla	Koerting	appears	to	be	the	first	and	most	recent	scholar	to	have	analyzed	the	document	in	depth—that	is,	with	a	focus	on	the	trial	as	its	own	event.	Koerting’s	relationship	to	the	revisionist	lineage	is	illuminating.	The	meat	of	her	research	consists	of	going	through	the	transcript	and	weighing	the	procedural	decisions	of	the	commission	against	authoritative	19th	century	manuals	of	military	law.	Though	structural	faults	impaired	the	defense,	she	argues,	the	judges	acted	not	only	within	existing	procedural	bounds	but	with	a	mind	to	respect	the	rights	of	the	defendant.22	In	her	literature	review,	however,	she	refers	readers	to	the	established	experts,	writing	that	the	prevailing	“scapegoat	theory”	is																																																									21	A	prime	example	is	the	number	of	scholars	who	have	cited	Rutman,	ignoring	his	extensive,	uncritical	use	of	unreliable	sources	such	as	R	Randolph	Stevenson,	The	
southern	side;	or,	Andersonville	prison	(Baltimore:	Turnbull	Brothers,	1876);	Louis	Schade,	Mr.	Louis	Schade's	open	letter	(Washington,	D.C.,	1867).	On	Stevenson,	see	Gillispie,	Andersonvilles	of	the	North,	35.	22	The	presiding	judge,	she	writes,	“granted	the	defense	far	more	leeway	than	most	military	courts	would	have	done,	but	even	his	patience	was	stretched	beyond	limits”	by	the	defense’s	delay	tactics.	Gayla	M.	Koerting,	"The	trial	of	Henry	Wirz	and	nineteenth	century	military	law"	(Ph.D.	Kent	State	University,	1995),	126-33.	
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adequate	to	explain	the	trials’	occurrence	and	that	Wirz	was	the	“victim”	of	a	hostile	press	and	petty	political	maneuvers.23	She	ostensibly	does	this	to	bracket	off	political	concerns	so	as	to	delve	into	legalistic	ones.	The	result	is	that,	though	her	findings	contradict	the	works	she	cites,	Koerting	never	attempts	to	square	the	two.	The	other	historian	to	work	extensively	with	the	transcript	is	William	Marvel,	arguably	the	most	prominent	Wirz	revisionist	today.	Unlike	Koerting,	his	analysis	of	the	trial	in	The	Last	Depot	(1994)	plays	a	somewhat	peripheral	role	in	relation	to	the	basic	argument	of	the	book,	which	is	directed	towards	the	wartime	reality	of	Andersonville	prison.	The	same	is	true	for	Hesseltine’s	Civil	War	Prisons.	What	Hesseltine	does,	primarily,	is	review	records	pertaining	to	various	POW	camps.	Marvel,	who	is	interested	in	reconstructing	day-to-day	life	at	Andersonville,	works	with	the	Wirz	transcript	with	the	intention	of	comparing	testimony	with	other	primary	sources.	A	short	analysis	of	the	trial	is	tacked	on	at	the	end	of	the	book	to	strengthen	Marvel’s	larger	goal	of	“absolving”	Wirz.	24	Similarly,	in	Civil	War	Prisons,	the	trial	appears	at	the	very	end	to	illustrate	the	“psychosis”	that	led	so	many	in	the	North	to	believe	in	a	conspiracy	to	exterminate	POWs.	In	effect,	Hesseltine’s	theory	is	not	so	much	an	explanation	of	why	the	trial	occurred	as	an	explanation	of	how	people	could	believe	in	patent	falsehoods—how	they	could	elevate	them,	even,	to	the	status	of	official	truth.	Marvel	does	the	same,	attaching	a	greater	quantum	of	malice	to	the	prosecutors,	the	judges,	and	the	POWs	who	testified	against	Wirz.	In	my	view,	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	a	fair	legal	process	will	inevitably	arrive	at	the	truth,	nor	is	the	aim	of	the	present	study	to	uncover	the	truth	as	far	as	Civil	War	prisons	are	concerned.	My	focus	here	is	on	the	trial	as	an	event,	and	the	“appease	the	public	hysteria”25	framework	simply	does	not	go	far	to	explain	its	occurrence.	While	Northern	public	sentiment—inflamed	by	Lincoln’s	assassination	and	the	war	generally—can	be	seen	as	a	necessary	factor	for	the	trials’	occurrence,	it	is	not	necessary	and	sufficient.	The	scenario	is	just	as	probable—and	the	ultimate	success	of	amnesty	policies	in	Reconstruction	underlines	this	probability—that	the																																																									23	Koerting,	"Nineteenth	century	military	law,"	221-3. 24	Frank	L	Byrne,	"Andersonville:	The	Last	Depot,"	Civil	War	History	41,	no.	2	(1995).	25	Marvel,	The	Last	Depot,	247.	
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public	could	have	been	just	as	furious	and	yet	zero	war	crimes	trials	took	place,	as	was	the	case	for	every	post-war	settlement	prior	to	this	one.	How	to	account	for	the	lack	of	a	precedent	or	historical	script	for	these	trials?	Why,	if	politicians	and	military	leaders	had	always	agreed	to	certain	terms	of	victory	and	defeat	that	excluded	criminal	culpability,	would	they	suddenly	do	the	reverse?	And	why,	if	the	public	wanted	revenge,	would	they	demand	a	long,	formally	constrained	judicial	process	that	gives	the	defendants	a	stage	to	espouse	their	views	and	that	could	result	in	acquittal?	Indeed,	what	is	not	accounted	for	in	the	Wirz-centric	literature	is	the	acquittal	rate	for	Confederate	officers	on	trial:	two	out	of	three.	Koerting	is	one	of	the	few	scholars	to	speak	on	this	matter,	albeit	briefly.	Because	she	relies	on	the	“scapegoat	theory”	to	explain	the	trials’	political	context,	she	considers	it	“a	peculiar	twist	of	fate”	that	Gee,	facing	charges	similar	to	Wirz,	was	acquitted	the	next	year.26	Grasping	for	explanations	for	Gee’s	acquittal,	Koerting	points	to	the	fact	that,	unlike	Wirz,	Gee	was	not	a	foreigner	and	that	the	judges	were	not	“handpicked”	by	Joseph	Holt,	who	directed	the	prosecution.27	Koerting	does	not	consider	the	most	straightforward	explanation,	one	already	implied	by	her	main	analysis:	that	the	case	against	Wirz	was	far	stronger,	that	the	judges	weighed	the	evidence	and	came	to	a	sensible	decision	in	each	case—an	argument	that	in	no	way	rules	out	the	presence	of	political	motives	behind	the	trials.	My	point	of	departure	for	this	thesis	is	that	a	trial	can	be	infused	with	political	motivations	and	remain	sound	in	terms	of	legal	practice—as	my	primary	source	analysis	for	Wirz,	Mercer,	and	Gee	indicates.	In	the	next	section,	I	combine	this	theoretical	orientation	with	an	outline	of	the	trials’	legal	and	political	contexts,	factoring	in	recent	headway	in	the	scholarship	on	early	Reconstruction.	This	will	help	to	answer	those	questions	that	the	revisionist	and	legalist	accounts	leave	unanswered:	What	conditions	allowed	prosecutors	to	transgress	the	convention	of	post-war	amnesty?	What	goals	did	they	have	in	mind	in	doing	so?	What	contrary	conditions	and	goals	kept	them	from	realizing	their	prosecutorial	vision	more	fully?																																																										26	Ibid,	197-8.	27	Koerting,	"Nineteenth	century	military	law,"	197-8.	
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II.	Historical	and	Analytical	Correctives	Several	recent	works	by	legal	historians,	while	dealing	only	briefly	with	the	trials,	suggest	a	framework	for	approaching	them	that	does	not	mutually	exclude	political	motivations	and	legal	validity.	In	the	following,	I	will	sketch	this	framework	in	two	parts.	The	first	will	provide	background	on	the	general	development	of	war	crimes	law.	This	part	will	describe	the	reigning	convention	of	post-war	criminal	immunity	and	point	to	the	growth	of	federal	military	laws	and	legal	institutions	during	the	Civil	War	as	a	primary	enabling	factor	for	prosecutors	to	overcome	this	convention.	The	second	part	will	look	to	the	trials’	immediate	political	context.	I	apply	the	concept	of	the	“didactic	trial”	to	clarify	the	political	motivations	of	the	prosecutors,	who	wanted	to	instill	an	anti-Confederate	version	of	the	war’s	events	in	the	minds	of	Southern	and	Northern	publics.	Their	prosecutions	were	also	part	of	the	attempt	to	extend	military	legal	institutions	beyond	the	war	so	as	to	enforce	federal	reforms	in	the	South.	This	aspect	in	particular	spurred	political	opposition	from	within	the	military	and	legal	establishments	as	well	as	from	President	Johnson,	who	effectively	worked	to	curb	the	ambitions	of	war	crimes	prosecutors.	
	
II.I.	Legal	Context:	Confronting	the	Convention	of	Immunity	One	thing	that	the	existing	literature	fails	to	articulate	is	the	precise	nature	of	the	convention	that	these	trials	transgressed	and	how	this	convention	manifested	in	the	trials	themselves.	Legalist	and	revisionist	histories	do	not	make	clear	how	great	of	a	legal	hurdle	the	convention	posed	to	the	prosecutors;	how,	for	the	most	part,	the	convention	triumphed	over	their	efforts;	and	how	this	triumph	was	a	product	both	of	legal	and	political	reasoning.	It	was	clear	enough	to	Wirz’s	counsel	that,	as	an	ex-Confederate	officer,	Wirz	was	called	before	“a	tribunal	unauthorized	by	either	statute,	military	law,	martial	law,	or	well-established	usage”	for	charges	that	were	not	“punishable	under	the	laws	of	war.”28	These	were	the	counsel’s	own	words	at	the	beginning	of	the	trial,	and	according	to	the	legal	thinking	of	the	day,	his	was	arguably	a	fair	assessment.	War																																																									28	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	11.	
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crimes,	or	the	application	of	individual	criminal	culpability	to	wartime	acts,	did	not	yet	exist	as	we	now	understand	them.	Even	at	the	start	of	the	20th	century,	violations	of	the	laws	of	war	were	considered	“delinquencies”	rather	than	“crimes”:	it	was	the	exclusive	right	of	the	violator’s	own	government	to	punish	them,	while	a	victim’s	recourse	was	to	diplomacy	or	retaliation.29	Part	of	this	resulted	from	the	fact	there	was	no	recognized	power	above	states	to	determine	or	enforce	criminal	responsibility,	thus	“states	and	the	officials	under	whose	command	the	violations	were	committed	remained	immune.”30	The	status	of	wartime	violations	as	a	state-to-state	(as	opposed	to	criminal)	affair	was	the	reason	Wirz	became	so	important	as	a	precedent	at	the	end	of	WWI.	While	Wirz	did	not	occur	in	an	international	court,	it	established	that	international	codes	of	wartime	conduct	could	be	enforced	against	individual	offenders	through	the	courts	of	a	plaintiff	state.	In	this	way,	Wirz	helped	usher	in	“war	crimes”	as	a	legal	category,	serving	as	ammunition	against	the	convention	of	blanket	immunity	for	soldiers’	acts.31	How	was	this	convention	situated	in	the	early	stages	of	Reconstruction?	Answering	this	question	requires	an	approach	to	the	law-politics	relationship	unlike	that	of	the	legalist	and	revisionist	historians	of	Wirz.	There	was	infighting	among	judges	and	jurists	that	cannot	simply	be	reduced	to	legal	ideas.	For	them,	certain	political	commitments	were	always	implicit.	On	the	other	hand,	in	terms	of	political	self-interest	alone,	it	is	not	easy	to	explain	why	leaders	advocated	war	crimes	trials	at	all	considering	the	risks	they	entailed:	unwanted	revelations,	acquittals,	or	the	possibility	of	causing	instability.32	It	is	not	surprising	that,	in	the	broad	arc	of	
																																																								29	John	Fabian	Witt,	Lincoln's	code:	the	laws	of	war	in	American	history	(New	York:	Free	Press,	2012),	128.	30	Anne	Holthoefer,	"Constructing	International	Crime:	Lawyers,	States,	and	the	Origin	of	International	Criminal	Prosecution	in	the	Interwar	Period,"	Law	&	Social	
Inquiry	42,	no.	3	(2017):	720-21.	31	The	current	failure	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	to	gain	support	from	countries	such	as	the	U.S.,	Russia,	China,	and	India	can	be	viewed	in	light	of	the	same	convention.	Steven	W.	Becker,	"The	Objections	of	Larger	Nations	to	the	International	Criminal	Court,"	Revue	internationale	de	droit	pénal	81,	no.	1	(2010).	32	Gary	Jonathan	Bass,	Stay	the	hand	of	vengeance:	the	politics	of	war	crimes	tribunals	(Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press,	2000),	7-8.	
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history,	“victorious	armies	would	often	punish	their	defeated	enemies,	but	they	would	seldom	do	so	in	the	context	of	a	trial.”33	Only	in	the	last	century	have	such	trials	become	a	familiar	postwar	event.	According	to	Anne	Holthoefer,	the	fact	of	its	current	familiarity	is	the	result	of	a	laborious	conversion	from	international	“delinquencies”	into	“crimes”	that	occurred	between	the	two	World	Wars.34	Here,	I	would	like	to	reapply	her	argument	to	the	war	crimes	trials	of	early	Reconstruction—indeed,	these	seem	to	belong	to	the	very	same	conversion	at	an	earlier	stage	of	development.35	The	emergence	of	war	crimes	as	a	legal	category,	Holthoefer	explains,	can	be	explained	through	the	interaction	of	state	leaders	and	international	lawyers,	the	former	seeking	to	expand	their	right	to	punish	beyond	domestic	boundaries	and	the	latter	seeking	to	strengthen	autonomous	legal	institutions.	“States	commit	to	law	because	it	is	in	their	interest	to	do	so.	When	states	turn	to	law,	however,	they	also	commit	to	the	rules	by	which	law	operates.	This	reinforces	lawyers’	interest	in	upholding	the	law	and	preserving	it	as	institutionally	distinct	from	politics.”36	Holthoefer	shows	that	the	mere	presence	of	political	will	cannot	explain	the	successful	staging	of	prosecutions	at	Nuremberg,	and	that	the	absence	of	political	will	cannot	explain	the	eventual	collapse	of	prosecutions	after	World	War	I.	While	political	enablement	was	fully	necessary	in	both	cases,	she	argues,	one	must	also	consider	the	extent	to	which	well-established	legal	instruments	and	institutions	were	in	place	“through	which	legitimate	claims	(and	counterclaims)	over	the	violation	of	international	law	could	be	made.”37	To	explain	the	occurrence	of	the	war	crimes	trials	of	early	Reconstruction,	the	issue	of	legal	instruments	is	as	necessary	as	that	of	political	support.	On	this	account,	it	is	essential	to	contextualize	these	trials	in	terms	of	the	Union	military’s	unprecedented	development	of	laws	and	legal	institutions	intended	to	regulate	Civil																																																									33	Friedman,	The	law	of	war:	a	documentary	history,	Vol.	2,	775.	34	Holthoefer,	"Constructing	International	Crime."	35	Recall	that	the	significance	of	Wirz	as	a	precedent	after	WW1	regarded	the	domestic	application	of	international	law,	not	international	law	or	courts	as	such.	See	supra	notes	11	and	12.	36	Holthoefer,	"Constructing	International	Crime,"	716.	37	Ibid,	726.	
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War	combat.	The	instrument	used	to	widen	this	scope	was	called	the	“military	commission,”	a	jurisdictional	conversion	of	the	court-martial	to	pass	judgment	on	civilians,	guerrillas,	and—in	a	post-war	scenario—commissioned	enemy	soldiers	(or	“belligerents”).38	Roughly	a	thousand	people	were	tried	during	the	war	in	military	commissions.39	These	trials	were	facilitated	by	the	War	Department’s	internal	justice	department,	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice.	The	people	who	coordinated	the	three	war	crimes	trials	in	question	were	precisely	those	who	had	built	up	the	Bureau	over	the	course	of	the	war.	The	Bureau’s	record	of	fairness	and	bureaucratic	efficiency	during	the	war	lent	it	institutional	credence	for	the	post-war	transition.	Mark	Neely	wrote	in	1991	that	“no	overall	study	of	military	commissions	exists	that	might	provide	an	institutional	and	a	historical	context”	for	more	“sensational”	trials	like	Wirz.40	In	the	past	dozen	years,	several	legally	trained	historians	have	filled	much	of	this	gap.	John	Fabian	Witt’s	Lincoln’s	code	(2012)	focuses	on	the	“radical	expansion	in	the	scope	of	the	laws	of	war”	carried	out	through	Gen.	Order	100,	or	the	“Lieber	Code,”	a	pathbreaking	attempt	by	the	Union	to	codify	international	norms.41	Joshua	Kastenberg’s	Law	in	war,	war	as	law	(2011)	reconstructs	the	conception	of	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice	and	its	daily	operations	during	and	after	the	conflict	as	a	parallel	justice	system	to	administer	these	laws.42	A	crucial	work	by	Detlev	Vagts	(2007)	shows	how	the	Bureau	transitioned	to	the	post-war	period.	He	provides	case	studies	of	Reconstruction-era	military	commissions,	revealing	the	strained	relationship	between	the	civil	and	military	court	systems	that	functioned	in	parallel	in	the	postbellum	South.43	While	noting	repressive	aspects	of	the	military	court	system,	for	instance	its	role	in	silencing	critics	of	the	Lincoln																																																									38	See	Gideon	M	Hart,	"Military	Commissions	and	the	Lieber	Code:	Toward	a	New	Understanding	of	the	Jurisdictional	Foundations	of	Military	Commissions,"	Mil.	L.	
Rev.	203	(2010).	39	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	267-8.	40	Mark	E.	Neely,	The	fate	of	liberty:	Abraham	Lincoln	and	civil	liberties	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1991),	161.	41	For	a	summary	of	its	provisions,	see	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	232-40.	42	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war.	43	Detlev	F	Vagts,	"Military	Commissions:	The	Forgotten	Reconstruction	Chapter,"	
Am.	U.	Int'l	L.	Rev.	23	(2007).	On	commissions	during	the	war	itself,	see	Hart,	"Military	Commissions	and	the	Lieber	Code."	
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administration,44	these	scholars	come	to	a	similar	conclusion:	that	those	who	set	the	system	up	(Judge	Advocate	General	Joseph	Holt	in	particular)	were	committed	to	implementing	rigorous	procedural	standards	in	favor	of	the	defendant.45	Of	the	legal	historians	just	mentioned,	Witt	and	Kastenberg	have	the	most	to	say	about	the	three	war	crimes	tribunals	in	question.	Each	dedicates	only	a	passage	to	Wirz	and	mentions	Mercer	and	Gee	in	passing,	but	their	conclusions	are	important	because	they	follow	from	an	informed	perspective	on	the	relevant	institutional	context	of	law	from	which	these	trials	emerged.	Witt	writes	that	despite	“procedural	irregularities,”	“enough	witnesses,	including	Confederate	and	Union	veterans	alone,	testified	to	brutal	acts	by	Wirz	that	his	responsibility	for	atrocities	at	Andersonville	was	well	established.”46	Kastenberg	writes,	“However	unique	the	accused	and	subject	matter	of	the	trial	was	in	comparison	to	the	thousands	of	military	trials,	Wirz’s	trial	was	conducted	in	a	similar	manner	to	the	majority	of	the	other	trials,	once	it	was	underway.”47	There	are	certain	biases	at	play	that	Kastenberg	and	Witt	overlook,	perhaps	because	they	work	with	an	abridgment	instead	of	the	original	
Wirz	transcript.	All	the	same,	their	work	reflects	my	general	view	that	while	political	forces	“created	the	space”	for	the	trial,	the	verdict	was	determined	primarily	by	the	legal	process—that	is,	the	formal	evaluation	of	evidence.			
II.II.	Political	Context:	The	Pro-Reconstruction	Didactic	Trial		We	have	some	background,	now,	on	the	convention	of	criminal	immunity	and	the	institutional	build-up	of	military	law	that	presented	the	means	to	break	this																																																									44	See	Neely,	The	fate	of	liberty,	51-74,	93-112.	45	Holt	insisted	on	the	provision	of	defense	counsels,	traditionally	unprovided	for	in	courts-martial.	He	also	implemented	a	strict	system	of	review	for	all	proceedings,	leading	to	hundreds	of	convictions’	annulment	on	procedural	grounds.	Kastenberg,	
Law	in	war,	9-10,	63;	Hart,	"Military	Commissions	and	the	Lieber	Code,"	58-65.	These	actions	do	not	resonate	with	Marvel’s	claim,	in	line	with	the	revisionist	lineage,	that	Holt	was	the	“War	Department’s	grand	inquisitor,”	who	proved	“amenable	to	[Secretary	of	War]	Stanton’s	ultimate	intentions	for	the	[Bureau]	as	an	agency	for	the	enforcement	of	political	doctrine	and	the	dissemination	of	partisan	propaganda.”	Marvel,	Lincoln's	Autocrat:	The	Life	of	Edwin	Stanton,	623.	46	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	301.	47	He	describes	prior	research	on	Wirz	as	“slovenly.”	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	257.	
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convention.	But	what	did	war	crimes	prosecutions	mean	for	the	immediate	context	of	Reconstruction?	What	was	the	political	interest	in	“creating	the	space”	for	the	trials,	and	why	did	others	fight	to	close	this	space?		The	revisionists	use	the	term	“propaganda”	to	explain	the	trials’	political	utility.	In	this	context,	the	term	subtly	pushes	one	to	think	that	while	the	law	seeks	justice	and	truth,	politics	weaponizes	justice	and	warps	the	truth.	In	its	place,	I	use	“didactic	function,”	a	term	I	have	lifted	from	the	recent	theoretical	literature	on	political	trials.	The	essential	drive	of	this	literature	is	“to	dispel	the	myth	that	political	trials	are	incompatible	with	the	rule	of	law.”48	What	is	important	is	not	if	trials	are	political,	but	what	politics	they	serve.	One	of	the	first	works	to	argue	this	was	Judith	Shklar’s	Legalism	(1964).49	Shklar	found	most	political	trials	difficult	to	justify	according	to	a	normative	evaluation	of	their	immediate	goals.	However,	she	took	the	Nuremberg	trials	as	an	exception.	Beyond	working	to	eliminate	political	enemies	(which	summary	executions	could	have	accomplished),50	Shklar	viewed	the	trials	as	justified	in	terms	of	their	revelation	of	historical	facts—which	influenced	the	constitutional	framers	of	the	Bundesrepublik	Deutschland—as	well	as	their	role	in	re-establishing	liberal	norms	in	the	vacuum	left	by	the	National	Socialist	state.51	These	last	aspects	belong	to	what	Lawrence	Douglas	terms	the	“didactic”	function	of	war	crimes	trials:	to	create	a	historical	record,	to	locate	moral	lessons	to	shape	public	memory,	and	to	honor	victims.	More	generally,		Didactic	trials	are	[…]	charged	with	the	task	of	actively	re-imposing	norms	into	spaces	in	which	rule-based	legality	has	been	either	radically	evacuated	or	perverted.	As	a	consequence,	one	of	the	principal	functions	of	the	didactic	
																																																								48	Jens	Meierhenrich	and	Devin	O.	Pendas,	Political	trials	in	theory	and	history	(Cambridge,	United	Kingdom:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2016),	49-51.	49	More	broadly,	Shklar	argued	that	“legalism,”	the	belief	that	rule-based	procedures	should	resolve	all	societal	conflicts,	is	itself	a	political	ideology.	Shklar,	Legalism,	1-3,	143-46.	50	During	World	War	II,	Churchill,	Roosevelt,	and	Stalin	all	entertained	the	idea	of	mass	summary	execution	as	a	way	to	deal	with	German	leaders.	Leon	Goldensohn	and	Robert	Gellately,	The	Nuremberg	Interviews:	An	American	Psychiatrist's	
Conversations	with	the	Defendants	and	Witnesses	(Vintage	Books,	2005),	viii.	51	Shklar,	Legalism,	178.	
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trial	is	entirely	circular:	it	is	to	show	that	the	trial	itself	can	fairly	discharge	the	task	assigned	to	it.52			 Douglas	offers	two	crucial	points	for	the	present	study.	The	first	is	that,	beyond	validating	or	invalidating	a	court’s	factual	conclusions,	it	is	possible	to	study	the	trial	as	a	distinct	historiographic	process.	Whether	or	not	we	agree	with	the	narrative	that	Wirz	and	the	Confederate	leadership	were	barbarous,	we	can	look	at	the	act	of	creating	narratives	through	what	Meierhenrich	and	Pendas	call	the	“constitutive	rules”	of	the	trial—its	formal	structure,	its	modes	of	configuring	and	contesting	evidence.53	The	question	of	whether	these	rules	are	adequate,	of	whether	trials	can	effectively	create	historical	records,	is	open	to	debate.	For	one,	trials	deviate	from	academic	history	writing	in	that	they	must	reach	a	single,	authoritative	judgment.54	The	political	background	to	these	trials	adds	a	whole	other	dimension.	The	platform	granted	the	defense	to	further	their	own	didactic	ends—in	our	case,	publicizing	pro-Confederate	narratives	of	the	war—can	undermine	the	political	support	necessary	to	constitute	the	court	in	the	first	place.	Aware	of	this,	judges	may	follow	a	double	standard	in	what	testimony	they	restrict—as	we	will	see	in	Wirz.	As	Meierhenrich	et	al.	point	out,	Douglas	lays	out	only	the	liberal	conception	of	the	didactic	trial,	and	the	above	problems	belong	to	this	conception.	The	“show	trial”	in	the	Stalinist	sense,	with	fixed	outcomes,	is	another	form.55	The	mistake	made	by	many	revisionists	in	depicting	Wirz	as	an	outright	show	trial56	is	that,	in																																																									52	Lawrence	Douglas,	"The	Didactic	Trial:	Filtering	History	and	Memory	into	the	Courtroom,"	European	Review	14,	no.	4	(2006):	514.	53	Meierhenrich	and	Pendas,	Political	trials,	42.	54	Criminal	courts	also	apply	definitions	of	causality	and	liability	that	are	arguably	ill-suited	to	the	interpretation	of	broad,	ambiguous	historical	processes.	See	R.A.	Wilson,	Writing	History	in	International	Criminal	Trials	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2011),	79;	Shklar,	Legalism,	195-7.	55	Meierhenrich	and	Pendas,	Political	trials,	54.	Gary	Bass	argues	that,	historically,	this	form	has	only	cropped	up	in	illiberal	states.	In	contrast,	when	prosecuting	war	crimes,	liberal	states	have	generally	respected	the	ground	rules	of	due	process.	Bass,	
Stay	the	hand	of	vengeance,	24-8.	56	For	the	most	radical	expression	of	the	“show	trial”	accusation	among	recent	revisionists,	see	Davis,	Ghosts	and	Shadows,	192.	Some	revisionist	critiques	are	more	tempered,	for	example,	Laska	and	Smith,	"'Hell	and	the	Devil'."	
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overstating	their	critique,	they	fail	to	perceive	that	the	fundamental	problems	posed	by	Wirz	do	not	lie	in	the	distinction	between	show	trial	and	liberal	didactic	trial	but	rather	in	the	contradictions	within	the	liberal	didactic	trial.	One	of	these	contradictions	relates	to	the	second	key	issue	brought	up	by	Douglas:	the	function	of	the	didactic	trial	to	“legitimate	itself.”57	In	our	case,	the	prosecutors	intended	to	legitimate	military	tribunals	as	a	legal	venue	for	Southern	Reconstruction,	an	intention	which	begs	the	question	of	what	was	truly	“liberal”	under	the	circumstances.	The	suspension	of	habeas	corpus,	or	the	right	of	all	citizens	to	appear	before	a	civilian	court	with	a	jury,	was	the	initial	basis	of	a	prolonged	military	occupation	of	the	South.	Southerners	considered	this	state	of	exception	to	be	a	blatant	violation	of	the	American	Constitution.	On	the	other	hand,	from	the	perspective	of	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice,	the	alternative	of	allowing	civilian	courts	to	function	without	federal	intrusion	would	have	meant	the	restoration	of	a	pre-war	status	quo:	legally-enforced	white	supremacy.		Here,	I	cannot	attempt	to	resolve	these	contradictions.	It	will	suffice	to	ask:	what	politics	did	the	trials	serve?	What	politics	did	the	absence	of	further	trials	serve?	On	the	pro-trial	side,	recent	scholarship	points	to	the	agenda	of	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice,	which	resonated	with	radical	Republicans	in	Congress.	For	the	Bureau,	the	postwar	trials	were	a	logical	extension	of	the	project	to	codify	the	laws	of	war	and	create	enforcement	mechanisms—a	way	of	saying:	we	told	you	these	were	crimes,	now	we	are	treating	them	as	such.	In	terms	of	the	larger	radical	agenda,	however,	the	function	of	the	trials	took	on	a	second	layer	of	meaning—a	way	of	saying:	the	South	cannot	be	restored	to	its	previous	leaders	because	of	what	history	proves	about	their	character.	The	trials	were	thus	a	medium	to	express	the	necessity	of	a	forceful	reorganization	of	the	South	as	well	as	the	legitimacy	of	military	courts	as	an	instrument	to	this	end.	Beyond	the	issue	of	war	crimes,	keeping	the	system	of	military	courts	in	place	was	crucial	for	the	army	to	fulfill	its	larger	role	
																																																								57	Douglas,	"The	Didactic	Trial,"	515.	
	 22	
in	the	postbellum	South:	protecting	blacks	and	white	unionists	from	violence,	supervising	elections,	and	working	out	labor	contract	systems	to	displace	slavery.58	Opposition	to	the	war	crimes	trials	came	from	several	angles.	The	first	emerged	within	the	military	establishment.	It	took	the	form	of	amnesty	clauses	in	the	surrender	agreements	offered	by	Union	generals,	who	continued	to	defend	these	agreements	long	after	they	were	made.59	By	the	time	Wirz	demonstrated	that	these	surrender	pacts	could	not	prevent	the	prosecution	of	war	criminals,	Secretary	of	War	Stanton	and	Judge	Advocate	General	Holt	found	that	they	had	an	enemy	in	President	Johnson,	too,	who	began	granting	successive	waves	of	pardons	and	moving	to	reinstate	provisional	governments	in	the	South.	As	part	of	his	battle	against	Congressional	Republicans,	Johnson	attacked	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice.	While	this	attack	hindered	war	crimes	prosecutions,	its	deeper	motivations	lay	in	promoting	a	soft	Reconstruction:	Johnson	envisioned	a	quick	reconciliation	and	partial	emancipation	based	upon	the	good	faith	of	Southern	elites.60	In	declaring	the	war	over	in	April	of	1866,	in	the	middle	of	the	Gee	trial,	Johnson	tried	to	pull	the	rug	out	from	under	military	jurisdiction	in	the	South.61	That	summer,	he	replaced	Attorney	General	James	Speed,	who	had	been	sympathetic	to	prosecuting	former	Confederates,	with	Henry	Stanbery,	who	pushed	to	restore	the	power	of	state-level	courts	even	when	it	directly	undermined	Reconstruction.62	
																																																								58	During	Reconstruction,	over	a	thousand	military	commissions	took	place	(most	of	them	in	1865	and	‘66),	around	500	of	which	related	specifically	to	implementing	federal	political	reforms.	Vagts,	"Military	Commissions,"	236,	59.	59	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	265-6.	60	For	an	overview	of	Johnson’s	battle	with	the	Republicans	in	Congress,	see	Elizabeth	D.	Leonard,	Lincoln's	avengers:	justice,	revenge,	and	reunion	after	the	Civil	
War,	1st	ed.	(New	York	u.a.:	Norton,	2004),	173-91;	David	W.	Blight,	Race	and	
reunion:	the	Civil	War	in	American	memory	(Cambridge,	Mass.	u.a.:	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	Univ.	Press,	2001),	44-57.	61	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	307-8.	62	For	instance,	Stanberry	“prevented	district	Army	commanders	from	removing	southern	judges	who	refused	to	implement	federal	civil	rights	statutes	invoked	by	black	plaintiffs.”	Norman	W	Spaulding,	"The	Discourse	of	Law	in	Time	of	War:	Politics	and	Professionalism	During	the	Civil	War	and	Reconstruction,"	Wm.	&	Mary	
L.	Rev.	46	(2004):	2077-9.	
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Beyond	the	president	and	certain	generals,	another	source	of	effective	opposition	came	from	civilian	legal	authorities—as	I	show	in	depth	in	the	section	on	
Gee.	In	April	1866,	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	in	Ex	parte	Milligan	that	military	tribunals	were	unconstitutional	in	the	state	of	Indiana.63	While	this	decision	had	no	direct	bearing	on	the	South,64	it	was	a	hit	to	the	credibility	of	military	courts	and	had	a	dampening	effect	on	future	war	crimes	prosecutions.	Norman	Spaulding	has	argued	that,	after	a	brief	period	of	acquiescence,	the	“legal	caste”	(judges,	lawyers,	jurists,	and	professional	organizations)	turned	against	martial	law	in	the	South.65	To	legal	elites,	the	total	restoration	of	civilian	courts	seemed	necessary	in	order	to	uphold	the	Constitution.	At	the	same	time,	Spaulding	argues,	this	restoration	was	an	effective	way	for	them	to	reclaim	the	influence	they	had	lost	during	the	war,	even	if	came	at	the	cost	of	undermining	federal	policies	designed	to	protect	freedmen.66	The	alignment	of	this	constellation	of	anti-trial	forces	helps	to	explain	why	so	few	trials	took	place.	As	I	proceed	to	handle	Wirz,	Mercer,	and	Gee	individually—as	well	as	the	border	case	of	Pickett—I	will	show	how	prosecutors	indirectly	fought	against	these	various	sources	of	opposition	through	jurisdictional	debates.	Likewise,	I	will	show	how	prosecutors	took	on	their	formal	adversaries,	the	defense	counsels,	in	the	main	proceedings.	At	these	two	levels,	I	will	attempt	to	reconnect	the	trials	to	their	context,	piecing	together	the	meaning	they	held	for	early	Reconstruction.		
THE	WIRZ	TRIAL	In	August	of	1863,	the	agreement	in	place	to	facilitate	prisoner	of	war	exchanges	between	the	Union	and	Confederacy	broke	down	over	a	disagreement	regarding	black	soldiers,	whom	the	Confederates	refused	to	recognize	as	legitimate	
																																																								63	Supreme	Court	Of	The	United	States,	U.S.	Reports:	Ex	parte	Milligan,	71	U.S.	4	Wall.	
2.	(Library	of	Congress,	1866),	121-2.	https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep071002a/.	64	It	only	implied	that	military	courts	were	unconstitutional	in	states	that	did	not	secede.	Justice	Davis,	who	wrote	the	majority	opinion,	said	in	1867	that	there	was	“not	a	word	said	in	the	opinion	about	[R]econstruction	and	the	power	in	conceded	in	insurrectionary	States.”	Quoted	in	Spaulding,	"The	Discourse	of	Law,"	Note	8.	65	Ibid,	2080.	66	Spaulding,	"The	Discourse	of	Law,"	2073-91.	
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combatants	eligible	for	exchange.67	This	led	to	severe	overcrowding	in	Southern	POW	camps,	which	led	in	turn	to	increasing	death	rates.	This	was	exacerbated	by	the	collapse	of	Confederate	systems	of	transport	and	economic	production.	The	most	disastrous	example	was	at	Andersonville,	Georgia,	where	roughly	13,000	out	of	45,000	Union	POWs	died,	the	vast	majority	of	them	from	scurvy,	diarrhea,	and	dysentery.68	In	the	last	stages	of	the	war,	the	assertion	circulated	in	the	North	that	the	Confederates	had	implemented	a	“deliberate	policy	of	starvation	and	cruelty,”	which	was	seconded	by	well-publicized	reports	of	the	U.S.	Sanitary	Commission	and	the	Congressional	Committee	on	the	Conduct	of	the	War.69 	 This	assertion	later	translated	into	the	first	charge	at	the	Wirz	trial,	which	stated	that	the	defendant,	“commandant”	of	Andersonville	prison,	“fully	clothed	with	authority,	and	in	duty	bound	to	treat,	care,	and	provide	for”	those	prisoners	in	his	custody,	conspired	with	higher	officials	“to	injure	the	health	and	destroy	the	lives	of	soldiers…	to	the	end	that	the	armies	of	the	United	States	might	be	weakened	and	impaired….”70	Wirz	was	found	guilty	of	this	charge	by	the	ten	Union	army	officers	(seven	of	them	generals;	three	of	them	trained	lawyers)	who	sat	on	the	commission.71	Of	the	second	charge,	consisting	of	13	counts	of	murder,	either	personally	committed	or	ordered,	Wirz	was	found	guilty	of	10	counts	(one	of	which	was	mitigated)	and	not	guilty	of	3	counts.72	President	Johnson,	who	sat	atop	the	ladder	of	military	court	review,	signed	off	on	Wirz’s	death	sentence.	The	trial	began	in	August	1865	and	ended	that	October.	Roughly	140	witnesses	testified,	including	prison	guards,	POWs,	and	Confederate	and	Union	officials—recounting	day-to-day																																																									67	On	whether	the	breakdown	of	exchange	resulted	from	this	or	the	fact	that	non-exchange	tended	to	benefit	the	Union	military,	see	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	256-61.	68	Koerting,	"Nineteenth	century	military	law,"	60-61.	69	Bruce	Tap,	"‘These	devils	are	not	fit	to	live	on	God's	earth’:	War	Crimes	and	the	Committee	on	the	Conduct	of	the	War,	1864-1865,"	Civil	War	History	42,	no.	2	(1996):	125-7;	Hesseltine,	Civil	war	prisons,	197.	70	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	3.	71	The	full	commission:	Maj.	Gen.	Lew	Wallace,	Brev.	Maj.	Gen.	John	Geary,	Brev.	Maj.	General	Lorenzo	Thomas,	Brev.	Maj.	Gen.	Gershom	Mott,	Brig.	Gen.	Francis	Fessenden,	Brig.	Gen.	A.	S.	Bragg,	Brev.	Brig.	Gen.	John	Ballier,	Brev.	Col.	Thomas	Allcock,	Lieut.	Col.	J.	H.	Stibbs.	Koerting,	"Nineteenth	century	military	law,"	74-84.	72	Ibid,	807.	
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life	in	the	prison	in	depth	and	exploring	the	potential	culpability	of	various	Confederate	authorities.	It	was	a	colossal	media	event,	as	was	the	execution.73		I	begin	my	analysis	on	Wirz	by	breaking	down	the	jurisdictional	debate,	which	encoded	political	questions	central	to	Reconstruction	such	as	whether	the	war	was	truly	over	and	whether	the	Confederacy	had	been	a	sovereign	state.	I	then	move	on	to	the	main	proceedings.	I	argue	that	there	is	a	credible	chain	of	charges-evidence-verdict	indicating	that	the	trial	was	not	rigged,	regardless	of	whether,	over	the	ensuing	150	years,	many	of	the	prosecution’s	claims	have	been	debunked	by	historians.	I	back	up	this	argument	by	responding	to	the	allegations	of	legal	foul	play	made	by	revisionist	historians,	gauging	the	extent	to	which	political	commitments	warped	the	proceedings.	I	clarify	what	these	commitments	were	by	employing	the	concept	of	the	didactic	trial,	and	conclude	by	piecing	together	the	message	that	prosecutors	tried	to	convey	by	selectively	harping	on	crimes	against	POWs. 	
I.	Jurisdiction:	Breaking	the	Convention	of	Immunity My	first	goal	in	analyzing	Wirz	is	to	understand	how	the	prosecutors	overcame	the	post-war	convention	of	immunity.	In	this	subsection,	I	show	how	this	convention	was	dealt	with	by	way	of	jurisdictional	debates.	The	convention	manifested	both	through	Gen.	Sherman’s	surrender	terms	and	through	challenges	to	the	court’s	constitutionality.	I	argue	that	constitutional	challenges,	though	valid	from	a	formalistic	viewpoint,	were	an	implicit	appeal	to	immunity	in	that	civilian	courts	were	not	equipped	to	hear	these	cases.	A	unique	set	of	circumstances	allowed	federal	prosecutors	to	temporarily	overcome	these	challenges.			
I.I.	The	Defense’s	Appeal	to	the	Surrender	Terms	Conventionally,	in	wartime,	illegal	acts	by	enemy	soldiers	were	to	be	dealt	with	by	their	own	authorities	in	the	form	of	a	court-martial.74	After	the	end	of	hostilities,	the																																																									73	James	Gillespie	argues	that	“Without	a	doubt...the	most	decisive	act	cementing	images	of	Southern	barbarity	in	Northern	minds	was	the	trial	and	execution	of	Henry	Wirz.”	Gillispie,	Andersonvilles	of	the	North,	9.	For	a	summary	of	press	coverage	during	the	trial,	see	Koerting,	"Nineteenth	century	military	law,"	149-55.	
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“favored	practice	in	the	age	of	enlightened	warfare	was	to	grant	amnesty.”75	The	convention	manifested	in	the	trial	itself	when	the	defense	counsel,	before	submitting	a	plea,	argued	that	the	trial	was	in	direct	contravention	of	the	Sherman-Johnston	surrender	deal	of	26	April,	1865.	According	to	the	deal,	in	agreeing	to	surrender,	all	Confederate	soldiers	were	“permitted	to	return	to	their	homes,	not	to	be	disturbed	by	the	United	States	authorities	so	long	as	they	observe	their	obligation	and	the	laws	in	force	where	they	may	reside.”76	Because	Wirz	came	into	custody	as	result	of	this	deal,	the	defense	counsel	claimed,	the	federal	government	had	broken	its	promise—an	argument	later	recycled	in	Mercer	and	Gee.77 	 The	argument	goes	back	to	the	surrender	deal	itself	and	a	rupture	between	Sherman	and	factions	of	the	Union	leadership	who	intended	to	prosecute	Confederates.78	For	Gen.	Sherman—like	many	other	commanders,	including	Grant—maintaining	the	convention	of	immunity	was	a	point	of	military	honor.	In	Sherman’s	case,	it	also	sprung	from	a	political	calculation.	According	to	Mark	Bradley,	Sherman	“distrusted	the	motives	of	the	radical	Republican	faction	in	Congress....	[He]	believed	that	the	best	means	of	securing	a	lasting	peace	was	to	bypass	Reconstruction	altogether	and	let	the	southern	whites	determine	their	own	fate.”79	Sherman’s	agreement	to	generous	terms	of	surrender,	offering	amnesty	to	Confederates	regardless	of	rank,	was	a	first	blow	to	the	project	of	prosecuting	war	criminals.		The	counter-argument	of	the	prosecutor	was	accepted	without	comment	by	the	commission.	He	pointed	out	that	the	federal	government	had	quickly	repudiated																																																																																																																																																																						74	William	Winthrop,	Military	Law	and	Precedents,	2nd	ed.	(Washington:	Gov’t	Printing	Office,	1920),	794.	https://archive.org/details/cu31924020024570/;	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	74.	Spies	were	a	special	exception	to	this	rule:	see	Stephen	C	Neff,	Justice	in	blue	and	gray:	a	legal	history	of	the	Civil	War	(Harvard	University	Press,	2010),	78-79.	75	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	286.	76	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	9.	77	Ford,	The	captive,	16-18;	Turner,	"Confederate	Military	Executions,"	19.	78	Jonathan	Truman	Dorris,	Pardon	and	amnesty	under	Lincoln	and	Johnson;	the	
restoration	of	the	Confederates	to	their	rights	and	privileges,	1861-1898	(Chapel	Hill,:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1953),	95-99.	79	Mark	Bradley,	Bluecoats	and	Tar	Heels:	Soldiers	and	Civilians	in	Reconstruction	
North	Carolina	(University	Press	of	Kentucky,	2009),	18.	
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Sherman’s	surrender	deal	as	soon	as	reports	of	its	conditions	reached	Washington	in	late	April.80	All	the	same,	Sherman	brought	the	convention	of	immunity	into	official	terms	and	thus	gave	the	federal	government	the	appearance	of	bad	faith	when	it	decided	to	arrest	former	Confederate	soldiers.	As	we	will	see	in	the	section	on	Pickett,	this	was	central	to	Ulysses	Grant’s	thinking	when	he	worked	to	prevent	further	prosecutions	over	the	ensuing	year. 	
I.II.	The	Defense’s	Appeal	to	the	Constitution	The	defense	counsel	went	on	to	challenge	the	tribunal’s	constitutionality,	an	issue	directly	tied	to	the	question	of	whether	or	not	the	war	was	officially	over.	The	Constitution	guarantees	that,	in	the	absence	of	an	actual	“rebellion	or	invasion,”	legal	defendants	have	the	right	to	be	tried	in	a	civilian	court	“by	an	impartial	jury	of	the	state	and	district	wherein	the	crime	shall	have	been	committed.”81	Wirz	was	being	tried	in	a	military	court	in	Washington	D.C.;	the	defense	argued	he	could	only	be	tried	in	a	civilian	court	in	Georgia.82	While	Congress	had	signed	off	on	Lincoln’s	suspension	of	habeas	corpus	in	the	midst	of	the	war,	the	argument	that	this	suspension	remained	valid	after	hostilities	had	ended,	with	civilian	courts	again	in	operation,	became	increasingly	difficult	to	justify.	Norton	P.	Chipman,	Wirz’s	lead	prosecutor,	acknowledged	this:	“As	we	recede	from	a	state	of	actual	war	and	approach	a	condition	of	profound	peace,	we	doubtless	travel	away	from	the	cornerstone	upon	which	the	military	commission	as	a	judicial	tribunal	rests.”83	Part	of	the	attractiveness	of	military	courts	for	prosecutors	was	the	way	these	courts	could	insulate	themselves	from	meta-concerns.	Jurisdiction	was	contested,	but	the	judges	handled	it	summarily.	In	Gee,	during	a	similar	dispute,	the	commission	shot	down	the	defense,	arguing	“this	objection	being	technical	is																																																									80	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	14.	See	also	Maj.	Gen.	Wilson’s	testimony,	in	which	he	states	that	Wirz	was	arrested	under	orders	from	Gen.	Thomas	(who	happened	to	sit	on	the	military	commission)	to	disregard	the	Sherman/Johnston	armistice:	ibid,	269-276.	81	See	Art.	1,	Sec.	9	and	Amendments	5	and	6:	"U.S.	Constitution."	https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution.	82	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	10.	83	See	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	723-30.	
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waived,	as	it	is	the	intention	of	the	Government	to	try	this	case	upon	its	merits.”84	At	the	end	of	Wirz,	Judge	Advocate	General	Holt,	who	oversaw	the	prosecution,	extolled	the	military	commission	as	a	legal	forum	precisely	because	it	“was	[unencumbered]	by	the	technicalities	and	inevitable	embarrassments	attending	the	administration	of	justice	before	civil	tribunals.”	Revisionists	have	pointed	to	this	as	a	sign	of	Holt’s	ill	intent.85	It	is	true	that,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	Constitution,	the	jurisdictional	question	should	have	been	handled	by	the	Supreme	Court.	On	the	other	hand,	Holt	understood	that	the	habeas	corpus	arguments	were	intended	to	keep	any	war	crimes	proceedings	whatsoever	from	occurring.	In	Holt’s	defense	of	the	military	commission,	he	also	wrote	that	these	tribunals	were	indispensable	“in	cases	of	which	the	local	criminal	courts	could	not	legally	take	cognizance,	or	which,	by	reason	of	intrinsic	defects	of	machinery,	they	were	incompetent	to	do	so.”86	The	point	about	cognizance	(or	subject-matter	jurisdiction)	must	be	weighed	against	claims	that	these	tribunals	were	unconstitutional.	Beyond	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice	as	an	organization,	the	military	commission	as	a	venue	for	trial,	and	Gen.	Orders	100	as	a	legal	code,	there	was	simply	no	existing	infrastructure	of	criminal	law	to	handle	such	cases.	From	a	pragmatic	standpoint,	Holt’s	argument	of	“incompetence”	is	just	as	important.	How	could	one	expect	a	fair	trial	in	Georgia,	in	the	year	1865,	with	a	Southern	judge	and	jury?	The	same	issue	came	up	in	debates	over	potential	treason	trials.	While	civilian	courts	in	formerly	Confederate	states	could	unquestionably	take	legal	cognizance	of	treason,	the	chance	of	jury	nullification—i.e.,	of	jurors	voting	to	acquit	on	a	purely	ideological	basis—was	
																																																								84	Ford,	The	captive,	22.	A	nearly	identical	statement	was	given	by	the	commission	in	the	guerrilla	Champ	Ferguson’s	trial	when	the	counsel	tried	to	shield	Ferguson	with	Sherman’s	surrender	terms.	Frustrated,	the	counsel	exclaimed,	“Has	[this	court]	no	discretion	lodged	in	its	hands	at	all?	Are	you	babies	on	the	question	of	trial	and	giants	on	the	question	of	condemnation?”	Thurman	Sensing,	Champ	Ferguson:	
Confederate	Guerilla	(Vanderbilt	University	Press,	1994),	64,	48.	85	Rutman,	"The	War	Crimes	and	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,"	127.	86	United	States	War	Department,	The	war	of	the	rebellion.	Official	records	of	the	
Union	and	Confederate	armies	(Washington:	Gov't	print,	1880-1901),	3.5,	490-4.	
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uncomfortably	high.87	These	two	factors	indicate	that	Holt’s	argument	about	the	necessity	of	trying	war	crimes	under	military	jurisdiction	had	merit.	Indeed,	I	have	seen	no	reference	anywhere	to	a	post-Civil	War	attempt	to	bring	war	crimes	charges	before	a	civilian	court.	It	seems	rather	that	if	such	trials	were	to	take	place,	they	would	have	happened	in	a	military	commission	or	not	at	all—in	this	way,	appeals	to	the	Constitution	sought	obliquely	to	uphold	the	convention	of	immunity.		
I.III.	Enabling	Factors	for	the	Prosecution	Chipman	overcame	the	constitutional	challenge	with	two	arguments	that	were	also	sustained	without	comment.	The	first	was	simply	that	the	president	had	not	declared	the	war	over,	thus	the	tribunal’s	jurisdiction	came	under	the	umbrella	of	executive	war	powers.	The	second	concerned	the	nature	of	the	charges	themselves:	This	prisoner	is	charged	with	the	perpetration	of	offences	many	of	them	unknown	to	common	law	or	statute	law,	they	were	committed	by	a	belligerent,	in	his	own	territory,	in	the	exercise	of	a	commission	assigned	him	by	the	enemy,	and	in	the	execution	of	the	orders	of	his	superiors	given	in	violation	of	the	laws	of	war.	[…]	We	turn	then	to	the	code	international.88		Attorney	General	James	Speed	had	recently	issued	an	opinion	arguing	that	illegal	acts	of	war	could	only	be	tried	in	military	courts.	Like	Chipman,	he	argued	that	such	acts	belonged	to	a	special	category	of	law	to	be	distinguished	from	regular	criminal	codes	by	the	fact	that,	in	an	international	conflict,	commissioned	soldiers	received	the	“license	of	the	government	to	deprive	men…	of	their	liberty	and	lives.”89	Only	the	laws	of	war,	adjudicated	in	military	courts,	dictated	the	limits	of	this	“license.”	Here,	the	laws	of	war	took	the	form	of	Gen.	Order	100,	which	accounted	for	potential	defendants	beyond	Union	ranks—in	other	words,	a	code	of																																																									87	For	the	alternative	of	assuring	“loyalty”	among	the	jurors,	the	accusation	of	jury	packing	would	have	been	inevitable.	See	Nicoletti,	Secession	on	trial,	146-7.	88	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	762.	89	James	Speed,	"Military	Commissions,"	in	Official	opinions	of	the	Attorneys	General	
of	the	United	States,	Vol.	11,	ed.	H.	Hubley	Ashton	(Washington	D.C.:	W.	H.	&	O.	H.	Morrison,	1869).	Speed	points	to	Congress’s	right	to	“define	and	punish…offences	against	the	Law	of	Nations”	to	substantiate	the	notion	that	international	law	is	constitutionally	enshrined.	See	"U.S.	Constitution,"		Article	I,	Section	VIII,	Clause	X.		
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discipline	for	enemy	soldiers.90	Francis	Lieber,	its	principal	author,	had	anticipated	a	post-war	situation	in	which	no	Confederate	authority	existed	to	court-martial	its	own	soldiers.	Article	59	states	that	“A	prisoner	of	war	remains	answerable	for	his	crimes	committed	against	the	captor's	army	or	people,	committed	before	he	was	captured,	and	has	not	been	punished	by	his	own	authorities.”91	What	enabled	Gen.	Order	100’s	break	from	the	convention	of	post-war	immunity	was	the	way	it	handled	the	issue	of	Confederate	statehood.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Union	had	recognized	the	war	as	an	international	conflict,	implying	that	the	commission	of	a	Confederate	“belligerent”	derived	from	an	independent	state	authority.	But	the	Union	prefaced	its	recognition	of	Confederate	statehood	as	a	mere	gesture	to	facilitate	humane	wartime	conduct.92	According	to	Gen.	Order	100,	Art.	153,	dealing	with	the	Confederate	States	as	a	belligerent	power	“neither	proves	nor	establishes	an	acknowledgment	of	the	rebellious	people,	or	of	the	government	which	they	may	have	erected,	as	a	public	or	sovereign	power.”93	The	legal	frame	of	international	warfare	was	necessary	to	fix	the	charges.	Wirz	would	be	tried	as	a	commissioned	fighter	in	a	nominally	state-to-state	conflict	under	the	law	of	nations;	on	the	other	hand,	the	opposing	state—or	the	“so-called	Confederate	States”	in	the	language	of	the	charges—was	merely	a	legal	fiction	that	outlined	Wirz’s	responsibilities	as	a	commissioned	fighter.	What	kept	this	fiction	in	place	was	the	fact	that,	officially,	the	war	was	still	in	progress.		In	Chipman’s	words:	“The	spirit	of	rebellion	is	still	rampant….	The	war	is	not	over.…	The	whole	policy	of	the	government	towards	the	southern	States	sustains	this	idea.”94	A	war,	but	without	a	formal	opponent.	This	was	the	notion	underpinning	not	only	war	crimes																																																									90	Confederates	did	not	see	Gen.	Orders	100	as	binding,	but	they	were	at	least	aware	of	it	and	familiar	with	its	terms.	In	terms	of	POW	treatment,	Gen.	Orders	100	merely	codified	well-established	customs.	Paul	Finkelman,	"Francis	Lieber	and	the	Modern	Law	of	War,"	The	University	of	Chicago	Law	Review	Vol.	80,	No.	4	(2013):	2104-7,	25.	91	"General	Orders	No.	100:	The	Lieber	Code,"		The	Avalon	Project	(1863).	http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp#art154.	Art.	59	was	invoked	explicitly	in	Gee	by	the	judges	in	their	jurisdictional	ruling:	Ford,	The	captive,	21.	92	Nicoletti,	Secession	on	trial,	254-60.	93	"Gen.	Orders	No.	100."	94	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	729.	
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tribunals	but	radical	Reconstruction	generally—extending	the	state	of	war	beyond	the	end	of	open	hostilities	to	authorize	martial	enforcement	of	federal	reforms.95		
II.	The	Didactic	Function	of	Wirz	My	second	goal	in	analyzing	Wirz	is	to	understand	his	prosecution	in	terms	of	its	perceived	political	utility	for	Reconstruction.	To	do	this,	I	apply	the	concept	of	the	didactic	trial.	As	Kastenberg	points	out,	Wirz	was	chosen	both	because	his	alleged	crimes	were	symbolically	potent	and	because	the	case	against	him	was	strong:	he	could	be	tried	fairly	and	still,	with	a	high	degree	of	confidence,	be	found	guilty.96	Similarly,	I	argue	that	the	prosecution	can	be	understood	on	two	didactic	levels.	The	first	concerned	the	public	demonstration	of	due	process,	i.e.,	how	Wirz	legitimated	the	military	commission	as	a	legal	venue.97	The	other	concerned	the	specific	charges	against	Wirz	and	the	revelations	that	were	intended	to	wreck	the	“moral	standing”	of	the	Confederacy,	to	use	Kastenberg’s	phrase.98	In	Wirz,	the	prosecution	tried	to	show	not	only	that	the	Confederates	had	abandoned	the	laws	of	war,	but	that	their	actions	necessitated	the	forceful	imposition	of	enlightened	norms	across	the	South—and	that	the	form	of	imposition	should	be	the	military	commission.	I	start	this	section	by	evaluating	the	evidence	brought	forward	against	Wirz,	concluding	that	the	most	feasible	explanation	for	his	guilty	verdict	was	the	strength	of	incriminating	witness	testimony.	In	line	with	the	didactic	goal	of	showcasing	due	process,	I	find	that	the	prosecutor	and	judges	made	a	credible	effort	to	keep	the	proceedings	above-board,	openly	addressing	and	reacting	to	allegations	of	bias	and	corruption	made	by	the	defense.	Next,	I	consider	the	prosecutors’	other	didactic	goal	of	discrediting	the	Confederate	leadership.	I	evaluate	their	choice	to	broaden	the	investigation	beyond	Wirz’s	personal	culpability,	arguing	that	this	aspect	of	the	proceedings	opened	up	the	trial	to	forms	of	structural	bias	that—even	if	they	did	not																																																									95	On	the	”conquest	theory”	of	Reconstruction:	Nicoletti,	Secession	on	trial,	9-10.	96	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	257-8.	97	Koerting	writes,	“The	Wirz	trial	became	the	means	whereby	Holt...could	vindicate	their	use	of	military	tribunals	once	and	for	all	in	northern	circles.”	Koerting,	"Nineteenth	century	military	law,"	50.	98	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	257-8.	
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determine	Wirz’s	fate—weakened	the	trial’s	appearance	of	fairness.	I	conclude	by	explaining	prosecutors’	specific	choice	of	the	POW	disaster	as	the	emphasis	of	this	inquiry	against	alternatives	such	as	racial	crimes.		
II.I.	The	Basis	of	Wirz’s	Conviction	A	central	impediment	to	reconstructing	Wirz	is	the	absence	of	an	opinion	or	any	official	statement	of	the	reasoning	behind	the	verdict.	For	charge	2	and	its	13	specified	counts	of	murder,	each	guilty	and	not	guilty	finding	can	traced	back	with	some	confidence	to	specific	testimonies.	It	is	far	more	difficult	for	the	first	charge,	which	alleges	a	“conspiracy”	with	other	officials.	If	this	were	broken	down	into	“specifications”	like	charge	2,	with	individual	acts	of	cruelty	and	neglect,	we	might	trace	the	logic	of	the	finding	more	clearly,	but	no	specifications	are	given.99	A	guilty	verdict	for	charge	1	is	also	ambiguous	in	that	no	co-conspirators	were	on	trial.	The	commission	clearly	ruled	that	Wirz	himself	neglected	prisoners	in	a	systematic	and	criminal	way;	did	it	also	“rule”	on	the	existence	of	a	broader	conspiracy?	The	answer	lies	in	the	fact	that	by	design,	“in	addition	to	sitting	as	a	trial	court,	[the	military	commission]	also	served	as	a	fact-finding	investigation.”100	Only	Wirz	was	on	trial;	potential	co-conspirators	were	merely	investigated	in	the	same	process.	Listing	other	officials	in	the	verdict	was	akin	to	suggesting	future	indictments	based	upon	any	incriminating	revelations.	In	this	case,	the	judges’	suggestions	were	not	heeded,	as	none	of	Wirz’s	superiors	were	ultimately	indicted.	The	split	structure	of	trial	court	and	fact-finding	investigation	opened	the	door	to	a	number	of	potential	biases,	which	I	will	attend	to	below.	Here	I	am	concerned	with	the	verdict	itself,	which	was	binding	insofar	as	it	concerned	Wirz	personally.	The	issue	that	prosecutors	faced	in	defining	Wirz’s	personal	charges	was																																																									99	As	it	was	read	in	court	when	Wirz	gave	his	plea,	the	first	charge	laid	out	how	Wirz	installed	a	system	of	“cruel,	unusual,	and	infamous	punishment	upon	slight,	trivial,	and	fictitious	pretenses”	and	how	he	“wilfully	and	maliciously	neglect[ed]	to”	promptly	remove	dead	bodies	or	to	provide	shelter,	clean	water,	and	medical	treatment,	listing	mortality	estimates	for	each	form	of	punishment	and	neglect.	However,	before	the	commission	announced	its	guilty	verdict	at	the	end	of	the	trial,	the	charge	had	been	cut	down	to	a	single	paragraph.	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	3-5,	807.	100	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	60-1.	
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that	the	underlying	cause	of	the	alleged	crimes	was	systemic.	Guilt	could	be	not	assessed	as	one	would	assess	the	commission	of	a	murder	or	theft;	it	had	to	account	for	various	individuals’	agency	within	the	Confederate	system	of	POW	detainment,	including	their	responsibility	to	prevent	or	punish	the	misbehavior	of	inferiors.	If	we	consider	charge	1	an	embryonic	form	of	“command	responsibility”101—as	a	way	of	assessing	Wirz’s	actions	within	an	organizational	structure—there	remains	a	clear	correspondence	between	the	verdict	and	evidence	of	criminal	negligence	within	a	Wirz-sized	frame	of	authority.	Most	of	the	success	of	the	defense	regarding	charge	1	was	to	limit	this	frame	of	authority.	Multiple	doctors	testified,	for	instance,	that	Wirz	had	little	to	do	with	the	operation	of	the	hospital,	a	key	site	of	alleged	mistreatment.102	He	was	furthermore	shown	to	have	very	little	power	over	obtaining	supplies,	and	the	ranking	officer	at	the	fort	adjacent	to	the	prison	testified	that	Wirz	was	in	no	way	responsible	for	overcrowding.103	The	closing	argument	argued	that	Wirz	should	not	be	punished	for	the	“rash,	wicked,	or	imprudent	expressions	of”	superiors	who	hinted	at	a	conspiracy,	nor	for	“the	motives	which	dictated	[his]	orders.”104	In	the	end,	this	defense	was	insufficient.	Wirz’s	authority	at	Andersonville	centered	on	prison	discipline.	On	this	issue,	the	prosecution	delivered.	Beyond	confinement,	punishing	POWs	(even	for	attempting	to	escape)	was	generally	seen	as	a	breach	of	the	customs	of	warfare.105	At	Andersonville	there	was	a	“deadline,”	a	marked	perimeter	beyond	which	prisoners	were	told	they	could	not	pass.	As	the																																																									101	The	judge	advocate	defined	command	responsibility	broadly:	those	“sufficiently	high	in	authority	to	have	prevented	these	atrocities,	and	to	whom	the	knowledge	of	them	was	brought,”	were	culpable,	as	were	inferiors	who	followed	illegal	orders	
Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	751,	73.	Unfortunately,	there	is	no	record	of	whether	the	commission	accepted	his	definition.	On	the	20th	century	development	of	the	concept	of	command	responsibility,	see	Matthew	Lippman,	"The	evolution	and	scope	of	command	responsibility,"	Leiden	journal	of	international	law	13,	no.	1	(2000).	102	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	27-37,	81-85.	103	Ibid,	99-104,	221-2,	455-66.	104	Ibid,	starting	at	704.	For	a	summary	of	the	defense:	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	299-300.	105	See	H.	W.	Halleck,	International	law,	or,	Rules	regulating	the	intercourse	of	states	
in	peace	and	war	(San	Francisco:	H.H.	Bancroft,	1861),	430;	"Gen.	Orders	No.	100,"		Art.	56.	
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prosecutor	stated,	such	a	line	was	“not	a	crime	in	itself”;	it	was	rather	“the	recklessness	of	the	enforcement”	of	the	line,	which	Wirz	oversaw.106	Nearly	two-dozen	witnesses,	some	presenting	notes	written	during	their	internment,	testified	to	guards	shooting	inmates	arbitrarily,	often	for	reaching	over	the	line	to	get	water	or	food.107	In	no	case	was	Wirz	shown	to	discipline	these	guards.108	Furthermore,	though	Wirz	was	not	in	control	of	fixing	the	daily	rations,	he	could	withhold	them	as	a	form	of	discipline,	something	he	did	for	trivial	offenses	and	on	a	few	occasions	for	the	whole	camp,	which	was	suffering	already	from	malnutrition.109	Many	testified	to	other	undue	punishments,	some	of	them	resembling	torture.110	Several	witnesses	also	testified	to	Wirz	ordering	black	POWs	to	be	whipped	for	refusing	to	work.111	In	addition	to	all	this,	a	number	of	witnesses	testified	to	non-lethal	beatings	by	Wirz	himself.112	This	strengthened	the	prosecution’s	portrait	of	Wirz	as	a	man	capable	of	the	13	individual	murders	specified	in	charge	2.	Two	were	allegedly	beaten	to	death	and	three	shot	to	death	by	Wirz	himself.	On	Wirz’s	orders,	three	were	allegedly	shot	to	death,	one	mauled	to	death	by	bloodhounds	during	escape,																																																									106	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	766.	That	Wirz	was	in	control	of	prison	discipline,	see	testimony	of	Persons.	Ibid,	refer	to	index.	107	See	the	testimonies	of	R.	Kellogg,	J.	Brown,	Spring,	Huneycutt,	O.S.	Belcher,	T.	Hall,	Clancy,	N.	Clark,	Halley,	E.	Kellogg,	Bussinger,	Merton,	L.S.	Pond,	Bradley,	De	la	Baum,	J.	B.	Walker;	J.	Everett	Alden;	Corrigan,	C.	Williams,	P.	Tracy,	Crouse,	J.	Marshall,	H.	Lull,	Orcott,	A.G.	Blair,	S.	Riker,	T.	Walsh,	W.	B.	Francis,	J.	A.	Cain,	and	W.	Crandall.	Ibid,	refer	to	index.		108	Because	inmates	bathed	in	the	same	river	they	drank	from,	reaching	over	the	deadline	was	often	necessary	to	get	clean	water.	This	made	the	issue	particularly	scandalous.	During	the	proceedings,	the	presiding	judge	actually	made	a	sketch	of	a	man	shot	reaching	for	water.	"The	Art	of	Lew	Wallace:	Over	the	Deadline,"		General	
Lew	Wallace	Study	&	Museum.	https://www.ben-hur.com/the-art-of-lew-wallace-over-the-deadline/.	See	also	Finkelman,	"Francis	Lieber,"	2126.	109	See	e.g.	the	testimony	of	W.	D.	Hammack,	a	prison	guard.	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	refer	to	index..	110	On	undue	punishment,	see	the	testimonies	of	Way,	Goldsmith	(a	clerk	for	Wirz),	and	S.	Smith	(a	Confederate	captain).	Ibid,	refer	to	index.	111	See	the	testimonies	of	Spring,	Merton,	Maddox,	Dyer,	and	in	particular	of	Jennings	and	J.	Fisher,	who	were	personally	whipped.	A	white	POW	was	also	whipped	for	trying	to	escape	in	blackface.	See	the	testimonies	of	Huneycutt,	Bardo,	and	Maddox.	Ibid,	refer	to	index.	112	See	the	testimonies	of	Mundey,	Heath,	Dr.	Castlen,	Clancy,	Achuff,	Adler,	Bradley,		O’Hare;	R.	Tate;	W.	B.	Francis,	and	W.	W.	Scott.	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	refer	to	index.	
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and	three	killed	by	cruel	punishments.113	These	were	murders	according	to	the	laws	of	war,	not	a	domestic	criminal	code;	as	such,	the	prosecutor	had	to	show	not	only	that	the	victim	was	killed	but	that	it	was	not	a	result	of	reasonable	prison	discipline.		On	ten	counts,	the	judge	found	that	Wirz	was	responsible	for	the	alleged	murder.	The	revisionists,	following	the	defense	counsel,	are	right	to	stress	that	usually	(though	not	always)	only	one	eyewitness	could	testify	to	each	murder,114	that	they	could	only	vaguely	recall	its	time	and	place,	and	that	out	of	them	all,	only	one	could	identify	the	victim’s	name.115	Yet	no	revisionist	has	tried	to	account	for	the	three	not	guilty	findings—if	they	are	mentioned	at	all.116	Nor	has	any	mentioned	the	mitigation	of	one	of	the	more	controversial	charges,	that	Wirz	ordered	a	man	to	be	killed	by	dogs,	something	emphasized	in	the	defense’s	closing	argument.117	It	appears	likely,	furthermore,	that	the	defense	was	instrumental	in	at	least	one	of	the	not	guilty	findings:	specification	13,	for	pistol-whipping	a	POW.118	The	defense	had	multiple	expert	witnesses	testify	that	damage	to	both	of	Wirz’s	arms	was	serious	enough	to	have	prevented	such	a	brutal	beating.119	In	short,	while	the	judges	were																																																									113	Ibid,	6-8.	114	In	attempting	to	link	counts	of	murder	to	specific	testimonies,	I	concluded	that	spec.	1	refers	to	either	De	la	Baum	or	Conway;	2	to	Hogeln;	3	to	Gray	or	Snee;	5	to	N.	Allen	(not	certain);	6	to	Kennel;	spec.	7	to	eight	different	witnesses	(see	ibid,	792);	spec.	8	to	several	witnesses	(see	Wirz’s	own	version	about	“Chickamauga”	in	closing	statement:	ibid,	710);	9	to	Adler	or	Achuff;	12	to	J.	D.	Brown.	Ibid,	refer	to	index.	115	Chipman	responded	to	this	criticism	by	arguing	that,	under	such	extreme	hardship,	the	POWs	could	hardly	be	expected	to	recall	all	the	details.	Ibid,	786-7.	116	Marvel	writes	that	the	”court	found	him	guilty	on	all	counts.”	Laska	and	Smith	mention	the	not	guilty	findings	without	commentary,	as	does	Hesseltine.	Marvel,	
The	Last	Depot,	246;	Laska	and	Smith,	"'Hell	and	the	Devil',"	127;	Hesseltine,	Civil	
war	prisons,	244-5.	117	The	commission	struck	out	the	words	“incite	and	urge”	(leaving	“cause”)	as	well	as	“encouragement	and	instigation”	(leaving	“knowledge”).	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	807.	118	Spec.	4	may	have	been	based	on	the	testimony	of	Davidson,	which	Chipman	advised	the	judges	to	disregard	(ibid,	743).	While	the	defense’s	cross-exam	of	Davidson	was	quite	effective	(ibid,	140-7),	it	is	unclear	whether	this	prompted	Chipman’s	advice.	The	other	two	not	guilty	charges	are	dated	August	3	and	20.	Wirz	was	revealed	to	have	been	away	for	a	couple	weeks	on	sick	leave	in	August	(see	the	testimonies	of	Col.	Fannin	and	Moesner:	ibid,	refer	to	index),	but	it	is	again	unclear	whether	this	revelation	affected	the	not	guilty	rulings.	119	See	testimonies	of	Dr.	G.	G.	Roy,	Dr.	Ford,	and	Dr.	Bates.	Ibid,	refer	to	index.	
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generous	in	accepting	vague	POW	testimony	for	the	prosecution,	they	remained	receptive	to	counter-evidence	presented	by	the	defense,	discrediting	roughly	a	quarter	of	the	murder	allegations	in	their	verdict.		
II.II.	Allegations	of	Foul	Play	Here	I	will	review	the	weightiest	allegations	of	unfairness	levied	against	the	judges	and	prosecutor:	that	of	coordinated	perjury,	tacit	collaboration	between	the	prosecutor	(also	called	the	“judge	advocate”)	and	the	judges	(the	“commission”),	and	intimidation	of	defense	witnesses.	Revisionist	historians	of	Wirz,	building	upon	allegations	made	by	the	defense	counsel,	have	pointed	to	these	as	the	basis	of	the	verdict—a	conclusion	that	does	not	sit	well	with	the	trial	transcript.	There	is	evidence	that	a	number	of	prosecution	witnesses,	in	particular	former	prisoners	of	war,	were	untruthful	on	the	stand.120	It	is	important	to	note	that	military	commissions,	structured	around	the	rules	pertaining	to	courts-martial,	were	designed	for	the	practicalities	of	martial	law	and	warfare.	The	loosening	of	procedural	rules—for	instance,	the	judges’	ability	to	alter	dates	in	the	original	charges	to	fit	the	testimony—and	reliance	on	notions	of	military	honor	made	the	court	particularly	vulnerable	to	shaky	eyewitness	testimony.121	There	is	little	existing	evidence,	however,	that	perjury	was	committed	at	the	behest	of	the	prosecutor.122	In	fact,	the	issue	of	perjury	was	addressed	explicitly	in	the	
																																																								120	The	Last	Depot	systematically	debunks	the	veracity	of	many	of	these	testimonies.	For	a	sample	of	Marvel’s	method,	see	Marvel,	The	Last	Depot,	endnote	50.	121	William	Winthrop,	a	contemporary	authority	on	military	law,	writes	on	military	commissions	that	“Where	essential…these	rules	and	principles	[of	law	and	evidence]	will	be	liberally	construed	and	applied."	Winthrop,	Military	Law	and	
Precedents,	841-2.	See	also	Koerting,	"Nineteenth	century	military	law,"	122,	69.	122	William	Marvel	has	assembled	the	most	concrete	evidence,	which	only	amounts	to	several	suspicious	incidents.	Marvel	refers	with	scant	citation	to	rewards	of	cash	and	pardons	for	suggesting	“compliant	witnesses”	who	lived	near	Andersonville.	Marvel,	Lincoln's	Autocrat:	The	Life	of	Edwin	Stanton,	965;	Marvel,	The	Last	Depot,	244.	He	mentions	that	Ambrose	Spencer,	a	witness,	was	offered	a	job	working	for	the	prosecutor;	and	that	another,	Felix	de	la	Baum,	who	perjured,	was	scooped	from	the	custody	of	a	provost	marshal	for	desertion	and	was	never	remanded	(ibid,	243-4).	Kastenberg	admits	that	revelations	about	de	la	Baum	undermined	the	court’s	
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proceedings.	The	defense	counsel	at	one	point	tried	to	retroactively	impeach	a	witness	after	it	came	out	that	he	had	admitted	his	dishonesty	to	another	witness.	The	court	reacted	by	offering	a	subpoena	to	call	him	back	to	the	stand.123	More	broadly,	Wirz	revisionists	claim	that	the	judges	tacitly	collaborated	with	the	prosecutor	to	undermine	the	defense.	Laska	and	Smith	write	of	the	“intimate	‘old	boy’	relationship	which	existed	between	the	prosecution	and	the	members	of	the	military	commission.”124	Marvel	points	to	“insurmountable	bias”	in	the	commission’s	rulings	and	holds	that	the	presiding	judge	"convicted	the	defendant	in	his	own	mind	at	the	start	of	the	trial.”125	All	these	points	serve	a	greater	argumentative	scheme	that	derives	the	judicial	result	from	political	directives.	In	this	way,	revisionist	works	obscure	the	paradox	at	the	heart	of	bona	fide	war	crimes	trials:	that	politicians,	in	a	peculiar	form	of	pursuing	power,	actually	divest	their	power	over	the	fate	of	the	prisoner	by	investing	it	in	a	legal	body.	It	is	true	that,	particularly	in	the	second	half	of	the	trial,	the	judge	advocate	and	the	commission	expressed	a	shared	annoyance	at	the	defense	counsel,	who	increasingly	relied	on	delay	tactics.126	This	reflected	an	ultimately	overwhelming	tendency	for	the	judges	to	overrule	the	objections	of	the	defense	and	to	sustain	those	of	the	prosecutor,127	with	an	arguable	double	standard	on	allowing	hearsay.128																																																																																																																																																																						appearance	of	legitimacy,	but	counters	that	the	state’s	case	was	“strong	enough	that	[de	la	Baum’s]	testimony	was	unnecessary.”	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	259.	123	See	portions	on	Alcoke	in	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	557-85.	124	Laska	and	Smith,	"'Hell	and	the	Devil',"	106-7.	125	Marvel	points	to	a	private	letter	by	the	judge—quoted	by	many	revisionists—in	which	he	contemptuously	describes	Wirz’s	physical	appearance.	Gail	Stephens	has	shown	that	Marvel’s	conclusions	are	based	on	a	misreading	of	the	letter.	Marvel,	The	
Last	Depot,	245;	Gail	Stephens,	Shadow	of	Shiloh:	Major	General	Lew	Wallace	in	the	
Civil	War	(Indiana	Historical	Society,	2010),	226-7.	126	Judge	Advocate	Chipman	called	the	defense	counsel	“puerile”	and	one	of	the	judges	called	his	behavior	“unendurable.”	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	608,	90.	127	By	my	count,	rulings	favored	the	prosecutor	57	to	12.	The	imbalance	partially	reflects	the	fact	that	the	counsel,	unfamiliar	with	the	rules	of	military	courts,	repeatedly	raised	objections	although	the	court	had	formally	ruled	against	him	in	similar	instances.	Hasian,	In	the	name	of	necessity,	127-8.	128	During	defense	examinations,	when	the	judge	advocate	objected	to	hearsay,	the	court	would	ask	under	what	circumstances	the	witness	had	heard	the	information	(e.g.	at	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	592.)	or	sometimes	sustain	it	outright	(e.g.	at	ibid,	459);	
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Still,	one	should	note	that	in	the	first	weeks	of	the	trial	(the	first	20	objections),	the	judges	ruled	about	equally	in	favor	of	both	sides,129	and	there	were	numerous	occasions	throughout	the	trial	of	clear	discordance	between	the	judge	advocate	and	the	commission.130		One	should	also	recognize	that	the	defense	exerted	real	power	in	the	courtroom.	As	discussed	above,	in	terms	of	charge	1,	there	were	several	major	allegations	that	the	defense	quite	conclusively	debunked,	and	the	activity	of	the	defense	was	likely	pivotal	in	the	three	not-guilty	findings	and	the	mitigation	of	the	dog-related	specification.	At	several	points,	the	commission	also	took	note	when	the	counsel	effectively	weakened	testimony	through	cross-examination.131	There	is	still	the	allegation	of	witness	intimidation	to	contend	with—that	the	defense	was	kept	from	examining	key	witnesses.	Many	revisionists	point	to	a	private	under	Wirz’s	command	named	James	Duncan	who	was	arrested	mid-trial	for	alleged	violations	committed	at	Andersonville.132	Incredibly,	no	one	has	noted	that,	in	direct	contravention	of	the	judge	advocate’s	argument,	the	judges	offered	to	call	Duncan	to	the	stand	for	the	defense.133	All	the	same,	it	could	be	claimed	that	the	arrest	had	a	dampening	effect	on	other	witnesses	on	the	fence	about	whether	to	make	an	appearance.	This	was	argued	by	the	defense	counsel,	who	stated	generally	that	defense	witnesses	came	“under	peculiar	circumstances”	where	they	felt	obliged	to	make	a	good	impression	on	the	government.	The	judge	advocate,	taking	these	words	to	insinuate	witness	tampering,	called	for	a	full	investigation	to	clear	the	
																																																																																																																																																																					generally,	the	commission	would	flatly	overrule	similar	objections	by	counsel	during	the	prosecutors’	examinations	(e.g.	at	ibid,	652).	129	See,	for	example,	the	effective	cross-examination	of	Col.	Gibbs	by	the	defense,	which	the	judge	advocate	unsuccessfully	objected	to.	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	20-27.	130	See	instances	of	discord	at	ibid,	150,	411-413,	423-25,	580,	and	691.	131	The	defense’s	cross-examination	of	Alcoke,	the	sole	witness	of	a	murder,	led	to	a	question	by	a	judge	about	a	factual	contradiction.	During	the	defense’s	cross-examination	of	an	officer	POW,	the	court	acknowledged	contradictions	within	his	testimony	about	a	man	dying	in	the	stocks.	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	216,	60-69.	132	E.g.,	Rutman,	"The	War	Crimes	and	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,"	125-6.	133	The	presiding	judge	stated,	“In	respect	to	Duncan,	I	do	not	see	any	objection	to	his	appearing	as	a	witness	for	the	prisoner.”	The	defense	never	followed	up	on	the	offer.	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	615-18.	
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prosecution	of	any	misconduct,	indicating	a	desire	to	keep	the	proceedings	above-board.	The	counsel	refused	to	give	any	names	of	witnesses	who	had	complained.134	The	counsel’s	complaint	about	witness	intimidation	similarly	applies	to	Judge	Advocate	Chipman’s	harsh,	openly	partisan	cross-examinations	of	defense	witnesses	in	which	he	questioned	their	loyalty	to	the	Union—for	the	most	part	tolerated	by	the	judges.135	It	also	applies	to	the	requirement	in	the	procedural	rules	(drafted	specifically	for	the	Lincoln	assassins’	trial	and	Wirz)	requiring	the	defense	counsel	to	take	a	special	loyalty	oath.136	While	these	actions	do	not	constitute	outright	misconduct	on	the	part	of	the	judges	or	prosecutor,	they	do	indicate	the	depth	of	influence	that	the	charged	political	environment	surrounding	the	trial	had	on	its	actual	proceedings.	In	the	following	subsection,	I	will	probe	the	extent	to	which	this	influence	damaged	the	trial’s	appearance	of	even-handedness.		
II.III.	Bias	in	the	Conspiracy	Investigation	The	military	commission’s	functional	split	between	trial	court	(for	Wirz	alone)	and	fact-finding	investigation	(implicating	higher	Confederate	officials)	inflated	the	political	relevance	of	the	proceedings	and	helped	it	become	a	media	sensation.	The	functional	split	was	largely	a	product	of	how	charge	1	(conspiracy)	was	framed,	and	though	it	was	permitted	by	the	procedural	rules	for	such	commissions,	it	opened	the	door	to	certain	biases	that	weigh	heavily	on	any	evaluation	of	the	trial’s	legitimacy.	As	discussed	above,	the	conspiracy	charge	was	poorly	defined.	While	this	appears	to	have	been	a	problem	of	conceptual	clarity	as	opposed	to	a	tacit	strategy	for	assuring	conviction,	one	would	be	right	to	criticize	the	prosecutor	and	judges	for	failing	to	erect	a	proper	barrier	between	the	investigation	of	the	defendant	individually	and	the	court’s	broader	probe.	We	do	not	know	if	the	judges	ultimately	
																																																								134	Ibid,	265,	701.	135	See	the	cross-examinations	of	Guscetti	and	Harris,	both	of	whom	had	apparently	published	articles	in	a	Democrat-leaning	newspaper:	Ibid,	520-528,	549.	136	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	6-7.	On	Stanton’s	role	in	implementing	this	rule:	Walter	Stahr,	Stanton:	Lincoln's	war	secretary	(Simon	and	Schuster,	2017),	439.	
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followed	Judge	Advocate	Chipman’s	definition	of	conspiracy,137	which	seemed	to	imply	that	incriminating	evidence	revealed	in	the	trial	about	higher	officials	could	add	to	Wirz’s	guilt	by	mere	association.	While	nothing	akin	to	an	explicit	conspiracy	to	murder	POWs	was	uncovered,	evidence	did	surface	that	top	officials	looked	the	other	way	when	internal	complaints	made	their	way	up	the	chain	of	command.138	If	the	judges	did	accept	Chipman’s	definition,	one	could	argue	that	it	constituted	a	violation	of	Wirz’s	due	process	rights.139	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	unlikely	that	this	element	of	“guilt	by	association”	had	much	of	an	impact	on	the	guilty	finding.	There	was	an	abundance	of	evidence	against	Wirz	pertaining	to	his	own	level	of	authority.		There	is	a	related	factor	of	bias	to	consider	here.	As	indicated	by	the	measures	taken	to	assure	that	the	defense	counsel	and	witnesses	were	loyal	to	the	Union,140	the	prosecutors	were	highly	anxious	about	the	potential	for	pro-Confederate	operatives	to	testify.	A	unique	procedural	rule	of	military	commissions	opened	up	the	potential	for	this	anxiety	to	translate	into	legal	bias:	Judge	advocates	had	the	authority	to	issue	subpoenas	for	prosecution	and	defense	witnesses,	something	unthinkable	for	prosecutors	in	civilian	proceedings.141	Revisionists	have																																																									137	According	to	his	definition,	Chipman	stated	that	whatever	was	done	by	one	conspirator	was	“the	declaration	or	act	of	all	the	other	parties	to	the	conspiracy.”	Yet	he	also	argued	mid-trial	that	the	defense	did	not	have	the	right	to	counter	testimony	without	direct	bearing	on	Wirz.	Counsel	responded	a	few	days	later	by	asking	Chipman	to	formally	declare	that	what	concerned	other	co-conspirators	would	not	incriminate	Wirz.	Chipman	refused.	The	judges	gave	no	ruling	or	clarification	of	the	counsel’s	role	in	this	regard.	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	750,	411-3,	40-1.	138	For	testimony	in	Wirz	that	Confederate	officials	knew	about	the	situation	at	Andersonville	and	failed	to	act,	possibly	shielding	Gen.	Winder,	who	oversaw	the	prison	system,	from	internal	complaints,	see:	ibid,	219-20,	224-7,	230,	239-250,	309-11,	416-422.	139	On	“guilt	by	association,”	see	Steven	R	Morrison,	"Relational	Criminal	Liability,"	
Fla.	St.	UL	Rev.	44	(2016):	7-9.	140	See	supra	notes	135	and	136.	141	Another	prosecution-friendly	peculiarity	of	military	commissions	was	that,	in	the	absence	of	counsel,	judge	advocates	were	required	to	fill	in	and	argue	both	sides.	Vagts,	"Military	Commissions,"	263-4.	Revisionists	have	pointed	to	this	as	another	form	of	bias	against	Wirz.	Over	the	course	of	the	trial,	the	counsel	did	withdraw	at	several	points,	but	this	never	led	to	a	situation	where	Judge	Advocate	Chipman	meaningfully	took	over	the	defense.	Chipman	deliberately	tried	to	distance	himself	from	any	responsibility	to	the	defendant.	See	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	594.		
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argued	that	Chipman	abused	this	power	by	refusing	to	subpoena	key	defense	witnesses.	They	do	not	mention,	however,	that	the	issue	was	brought	up	openly	in	the	proceedings.	Upon	the	complaint	of	the	defense	counsel,	Chipman	summarized	to	the	commission	the	few	exceptions	he	made	to	the	subpoenas	requested	by	the	defense	then	submitted	these	exceptions	to	review	by	the	commission.142		Those	he	refused	to	subpoena	included	Gen.	Robert	E.	Lee	and	several	other	high-ranking	Confederate	officials.	Robert	Ould,	the	Confederate	commissioner	of	prisoner	exchange,	initially	received	a	subpoena	that	Chipman	subsequently	revoked.	Wirz’s	counsel	responded	that	these	witnesses	were	no	longer	necessary	for	the	defense,143	and	Kastenberg	has	noted	that	“Ould’s	testimony	would	not	[have	undermined]	the	government’s	case	against	Wirz	at	any	rate.”144	Ould	would	have	provided	evidence	of	the	South’s	inability	to	feed	its	own	troops145	and	blamed	the	breakdown	of	prisoner	exchanges	on	the	Union	government.146	Similar	points	would	have	been	underscored	by	Lee	and	the	others	whom	Chipman	refused	to	subpoena.	Like	Ould,	they	had	no	information	to	offer	about	Wirz	himself—only	evidence	suggesting	that	a	conspiracy	to	kill	POWs	was	not	a	part	of	Confederate	policy.147	
																																																								142	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	615-8.	143	Ibid,	730.	144	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	259.	145	Evidence	of	the	collapse	of	the	Southern	economy	and	infrastructure	was	already	underscored	by	other	witnesses,	as	Chipman	pointed	out:	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	728-30..	See	the	testimony	of	Lieut.	Col.	Ruffin:	ibid,	refer	to	index.	146	For	a	first-hand	account	of	Ould’s	attempted	testimony,	including	his	own	retelling	of	the	prisoner	exchange	breakdown,	which	virtually	omits	the	issue	of	race,	see	Robert	Ould,	"Judge	Ould's	Vindication	of	the	Confederate	Government,"	
Southern	Historical	Society	Papers	1	(1878).	https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Southern_Historical_Society_Papers/Volume_01/March/Judge_Ould%27s_Vindication_of_the_Confederate_Government.	147	The	judges	gave	no	opinion	as	to	whether	witnesses	such	as	Ould	rightfully	kept	out	of	court.	However,	at	another	point	in	the	trial,	they	did	sustain	an	objection	by	Chipman	when	he	argued	that	exploring	the	causes	of	the	prisoner	breakdown	was	irrelevant	to	Wirz’s	personal	guilt.	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	691.	Counsel	had	recently	led	one	witness	to	testify	that	the	POWs	at	Andersonville	blamed	the	breakdown	of	prison	exchanges	on	their	own	government	and	hoped	for	McClellan	to	be	elected	in	fall	1864.	Ibid,	640-3.	See	a	related	exchange	at	Ibid,	696.	
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One	cannot	detach	Chipman’s	decision	to	revoke	Ould’s	subpoena	from	the	political	circumstances	of	the	trial:	allowing	him	to	testify	would	have	meant	handing	a	high-profile	ex-Confederate	the	chance	to	voice	anti-Union	polemics	in	the	national	press.	This	quandary	was	perhaps	inescapable—but	only	because	the	prosecution	had	broadened	the	scope	of	inquiry	so	far	beyond	Wirz’s	personal	culpability	in	an	effort	to	expand	and	manipulate	the	trial’s	publicity.	Norton	P.	Chipman	later	wrote	that	he	and	Joseph	Holt	saw	the	trial	as	”the	means	of	bringing	to	light	and	giving	the	history	and	the	whole	truth	as	to	this	prison,	and	not	simply	to	submit	evidence	to	convict	Wirz.”148	Holt	himself	praised	the	historical	function	of	the	trial,	stating	shortly	after	Wirz	that	“No	other	species	of	tribunal”	could	offer	the	“freedom	of	view	and	inquiry”	to	prevent	“one	of	the	most	important	chapters	in	the	annals	of	the	rebellion”	from	being	“lost	to	history.”149		It	is	true	that,	in	terms	of	its	procedural	structure,	the	military	commission	was	better	suited	to	exploring	the	deeper	causes	of	what	happened	at	Andersonville	than	a	regular	jury	trial.150	But	the	active	and	visible	suppression	of	counter-narratives—steering	the	investigation	away	from	Union	leaders’	role	in	the	POW	crisis—lent	an	unsavory	element	to	Holt’s	praise	of	the	commission,	one	that	likely	undermined	the	prosecution’s	didactic	goal	of	showcasing	legal	fairness.		
II.IV.	The	POW	Crisis	as	Didactic	Focus	All	three	trials	discussed	in	this	thesis,	as	well	as	the	near-trial	of	Gen.	Pickett,	concerned	the	treatment	of	Union	POWs,	and	a	memo	by	Holt	shortly	after	the	Wirz	trial	pointed	to	eighteen	more	specifically	POW-related	crimes	that	he	intended	to	prosecute.151	The	simplest	explanation	for	this	emphasis	is	the	level	of	public	outrage	at	the	time	about	the	death	rates	in	the	camps,	a	point	stressed	by	revisionist	historians.	In	this	section,	I	will	build	on	this	explanation	by	showing	how	the	narrative	pushed	by	the	prosecution,	in	exploiting	outrage	over	the	POW																																																									148	Norton	Parker	Chipman,	The	Tragedy	of	Andersonville	(Digital	Scanning	Inc,	2004),	27-30.	149	Department,	Official	records,	3.5,	490-4.	150	See	supra	note	100.	151	Department,	Official	records,	2.7,	782-3.	
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disaster,	tried	to	keep	the	message	palatable	by	emphasizing	white-on-white	crimes	and	playing	down	the	disaster’s	connection	to	racial	issues.	The	immediate	context	of	these	war	crimes	trials	was	the	battle	over	Reconstruction.	Those	leading	the	prosecutions	were	pushing	for	the	military	enforcement	of	freedmen’s	rights	in	the	face	of	Southern	and	Northern	Democratic	opposition.	In	a	recent	lecture,	Michael	Vorenberg	has	argued	that,	in	line	with	this	intention,	the	“crime	of	slavery”	was	on	trial	in	Wirz—at	least	indirectly.152	He	is	the	first	to	argue	this,	and	it	is	worth	exploring	the	extent	to	which	slavery	was	in	fact	emphasized	in	the	proceedings.		The	prosecutors	brought	up	the	issue	of	whipping	black	POWs	and	forcing	them	to	work.	They	put	black	witnesses	on	the	stand,	which,	theoretically,	if	the	trial	had	occurred	in	a	civilian	court	in	the	South,	would	not	have	been	possible	without	forceful	intervention.153	Still,	I	hesitate	to	emphasize	the	racial	side	of	Wirz	to	the	extent	that	Vorenberg	does.	One	of	his	major	arguments	is	that	the	prosecution	seized	on	the	issue	of	unleashing	catch	dogs	on	POW	escapees	so	as	to	invoke	the	image	of	runaway	slaves.154	But	in	this	case,	as	in	general,	the	outrage	was	only	indirectly	about	black	victimhood.	In	selecting	the	narrative	focus	of	the	POW	camps,	the	point	that	prosecutors	sought	to	drive	home	was	that	Confederates	had	stooped	to	crimes	against	other	whites—in	this	case,	that	they	would	treat	fellow	whites	as	badly	as	they	would	treat	slaves.	As	an	official	reproduction	of	excerpts	from	the	transcript	later	summarized,	Andersonville	represented	the	“...fruits	of	a	system	of	human	slavery	which	trained	its	devotees	to	acts	of	cruelty.”155																																																										152	Michael	Vorenberg,	"Judgment	at	Washington:	Lew	Wallace,	Henry	Wirz,	and	the	Elusive	Quest	to	End	the	Civil	War"	(paper	presented	at	the	conference,	A	Just	and	Lasting	Peace:	Ending	the	Civil	War,	Washington	D.C.,	2014).	153	Vagts	points	out	that	in	early	Reconstruction,	the	presence	of	black	jurors	in	civilian	courts	depended	on	whether	Republican	or	Democratic	regimes	prevailed.	Furthermore,	testimony	by	black	people	was	as	a	rule	inadmissible	in	the	South;	it	was	only	legally—not	to	say	practically—guaranteed	with	the	passing	of	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1866.	Vagts,	"Military	Commissions,"	264.	154	Vorenberg,	"Judgement	at	Washington."	155	Report	on	the	treatment	of	prisoners	of	war	by	the	rebel	authorities	during	the	War	
of	the	Rebellion,		(Washington:	Govt.	Printing	Office,	1869),	5-8.	William	Lloyd	Garrison,	in	his	commentary	on	the	Wirz	trial,	similarly	wrote	that	“Confederate	
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In	defending	Wirz’s	use	of	dogs	to	track	down	POWs,	the	counsel	pointed	to	a	ruling	by	Justice	Lumpkin	of	the	Georgian	Supreme	Court	in	favor	of	such	practices	for	returning	escaped	slaves	and	convicts.	The	prosecutor	responded	first	that	POWs	were	neither	slaves	nor	convicts,	and	second	that	local	law	was	irrelevant	in	a	case	governed	by	international	law.156	“Whatever	the	peculiar	forms	or	rights	of	this	or	that	government,”	he	later	stated,	“its	subjects	acquire	no	control	or	power	other	than	is	sanctioned	by	the	great	tribunal	of	nations….”157	In	this	way,	the	prosecutor	associated	himself	with	the	“the	rules	of	enlightened	civilization,”	as	he	called	them,	contrasting	“civilization”	to	the	Confederate	South	as	a	kind	of	backwards	province. Lumpkin’s	ruling,	he	argued,	“is	another	evidence	of	the	extent	to	which	a	naturally	strong	mind	may	be	warped	and	turned	from	a	strict	view	of	justice	when	compelled	to	square	it	with	a	system	of	slavery.”158	This	is	one	of	the	few	instances	in	the	trial	where	Chipman	actually	invoked	the	word	“slavery”	or	the	issue	of	race.	In	his	closing	statement,	Chipman	argued	that	the	crimes	in	question	were	“the	work	of	treason,	the	legitimate	result	of	that	sum	of	all	villanies,	and	which,	by	many,	very	many,	proofs	during	the	past	four	years,	has	shown	itself	capable	of	this	last	one	developed.”159	Chipman	identified	treason,	the	betrayal	of	national	loyalty,	as	the	root	historical	cause	of	crimes	of	Andersonville,	not	slavery.	That	he	worked	to	prevent	an	exploration	of	the	prisoner	exchange	breakdown—officially,	a	measure	by	the	Union	to	protect	black	soldiers—underlines	this	point.	We	can	ultimately	attribute	this	to	the	fact	that	the	decision	to	stop	exchanges	for	the	sake	of	black	soldiers	was	an	“extraordinarily	unpopular	policy”	among	voting	whites	in	the	North,	the	prosecution’s	foremost	intended	
																																																																																																																																																																					leaders	had	transferred	their	usual	inhumane	treatment	of	slaves	to	the	captured	enemy….”	Koerting,	"Nineteenth	century	military	law,"	194.	156	Trial	of	Henry	Wirz,	492,	771-2.	157	Ibid,	762.	158	Ibid,	771-2.	159	Ibid,	749.	
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audience.160	Witt	contends	that	“in	1865	and	1866,	prosecuting	high	Confederate	officials	for	crimes	against	black	Union	soldiers”	was	“politically	implausible.”161	Among	the	many	risks	that	didactic	trials	such	as	Wirz	entailed	for	the	prosecuting	party,	here	the	federal	government,	there	was	the	risk	that,	even	if	the	trial	went	according	to	plan,	the	prosecutors	could	miscalculate	by	choosing	a	narrative	that	did	not	resonate	with	the	public—or	that	was	misinterpreted	altogether.162	Prosecutors	may	have	feared	that	the	white	voting	public	in	the	North	would	be	indifferent	or	even	resent	an	emphasis	on	white-on-black	crime.	They	may	have	feared	such	trials	would	incite	race	riots	in	the	South	such	as	those	which	broke	out	in	New	Orleans	and	Memphis	the	following	year.163	These	are	all	hypotheses	to	be	left	to	further	research.	My	point	is	that,	even	when	the	chance	of	conviction	was	high,	bringing	alleged	war	criminals	to	court	entailed	a	set	of	considerable	risks	for	the	prosecuting	party.	These	risks	served	to	limit	the	scope	of	crimes	considered	politically	expedient	and	to	inspire	doubt	among	the	prosecutors’	supporters.	This	lowered	the	bar	for	opponents	to	prevent	their	work	altogether,	as	demonstrated	by	the	case	of	Gen.	Pickett.	If	we	ask	why	so	few	war	crimes	trials	took	place,	the	near-trial	of	Pickett	holds	out	answers.	
	
THE	NEAR-TRIAL	OF	PICKETT	As	the	Wirz	trial	came	to	a	close	in	October	1865,	a	board	of	inquiry	led	by	U.S.	army	officers	opened	an	investigation	into	the	execution	of	nearly	two	dozen	Union	soldiers	on	the	orders	of	Confederate	Major	Gen.	George	Pickett.164	The	object	of	the																																																									160	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	256.	Since	the	1864	elections,	Republicans	had	played	down	the	racial	aspect	of	POW	exchanges.	According	to	Neely,	they	“didn't	want	to	raise	an	issue	of	putting	white	prisoners	at	risk	for	the	sake	of	black	ones.”	Mark	E	Neely,	The	
Civil	War	and	the	limits	of	destruction	(Harvard	University	Press,	2007),	188.	161	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	320.	162	In	the	case	of	treason	prosecutions,	for	instance,	Charles	Sumner	doubted	their	didactic	efficacy:	the	punishment	of	a	few	elites,	he	thought,	might	lead	the	public	to	think	that	Reconstruction	was	unnecessary.	Nicoletti,	Secession	on	trial,	198.	163	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	314.	164	The	following	analysis	is	based	on	two	documents	assembled	by	the	Adjutant	General’s	Office	in	response	to	House	resolutions	demanding	updates	on	Pickett’s	prosecution:	"Executive	Doc.	98:	Letter	from	the	Secretary	of	War,	in	answer	to	
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board	was	to	decide	whether	Pickett	should	be	indicted	for	war	crimes.	The	executed	men	in	question	had	been	court-martialed	in	February	and	March	of	the	previous	year	by	the	Confederate	army	in	North	Carolina	and	sentenced	to	hang	as	turncoats,	that	is,	soldiers	who	deserted	to	join	Union	ranks.	Sources	claimed	to	the	contrary	that	many	of	these	men	were	never	officially	enlisted	in	the	Confederate	army;	that	they	were	POWs	tried	and	punished	illegally;	that	some	were	hung	naked	in	public;	and	that	some	of	their	widows	were	persecuted	and	robbed.	The	board	finished	its	investigation	in	November	and	came	to	the	following	conclusion:	The	object...	perpetrated	on	the	part	of	the	leaders,	was	to	terrify	the	loyal	people	of	North	Carolina,	to	make	them	subservient	to	their	foul	scheme	of	rebellion,	and	to	bring	contempt	upon	the	government….	It	is	the	opinion	of	the	board	that…	there	should	be	a	military	commission	immediately	appointed	for	the	trial	of	[Pickett	and	two	inferiors].165		The	finding	of	the	board	of	inquiry	in	November	1865	offers	a	clue	as	to	the	didactic	intention	of	Pickett,	that	is,	beyond	the	circular	function	of	all	such	prosecutions	to	legitimate	the	military	commission	as	a	legal	venue.	To	Holt,	war	crimes	tribunals	were	part	of	a	strategy	to	sever	the	Southern	public’s	allegiance	to	former	Confederate	elites,	who	at	that	time	showed	no	contrition	and	were	actively	making	their	way	back	into	positions	of	power.166	Consider	the	implications	of	spreading	the	idea	that	Confederate	authorities	“terrif[ied]	the	loyal	people	of	North	Carolina,	to	make	them	subservient”	to	the	rebellion.	We	again	have	a	focus	on	white	POWs	falling	victim	to	the	Confederate	leadership,	but	in	contrast	to	Wirz,	in	which	crimes	against	Northern	POWs	were	in	focus,	prosecuting	Pickett	would	have																																																																																																																																																																						resolution	of	the	House	of	Representatives,	of	April	16,	transmitting	the	report	of	Judge	Advocate	Gen.	Holt,	relative	to	the	murder	of	certain	Union	soldiers	belonging	to	1st	and	2nd	N.	Carolina	loyal	infantry.,"	1st	session	of	the	39th	Congress	(1866),	https://archive.org/details/executivedocumenunit/page/n333;	"Executive	Doc.	11:	Message	from	the	President	of	the	United	States,	in	Answer	to	a	resolution	of	the	House	of	the	23rd	of	June	last,	relative	to	rebel	General	Pickett,"	2nd	session	of	the	39th	Congress	(1867),	https://archive.org/details/executivedocumen7359unit.	165	"Exec.	Doc.	98,"		14-17.	166	Leonard,	Lincoln’s	Avengers,	177-96.	On	the	related	issue	of	oaths	of	allegiance,	Pres.	Johnson’s	preferred	strategy	for	ensuring	Southern	compliance	with	federal	demands,	see	Dorris,	Pardon	and	amnesty,	315-19.		
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shown	that	many	Southerners	were	also	victimized,	a	message	directed	to	sections	of	the	North	Carolinian	public	whose	allegiance	to	the	Confederacy	may	have	been	tepid	in	the	first	place.167	In	summer	1866,	the	officer	who	led	the	board	of	inquiry	the	previous	fall	wrote	to	Holt	asking	why	Pickett	had	not	yet	been	arraigned,	arguing	that	“The	poor	white	of	the	south	will	[lose]	confidence	in	the	federal	power	if	they	are	thus	forsaken	and	their	murdered	friends	unavenged.”168	In	the	end,	the	case	never	came	to	court.	Three	major	factors	overcame	the	impetus	to	prosecute;	all	three	foretold	the	ultimate	success	of	anti-trial	forces.	The	first	was	the	hesitation	to	prosecute	by	Judge	Advocate	General	Holt	himself,	a	direct	consequence	of	his	commitment	to	putting	on	a	procedurally	sound	trial.	The	second	was	Secretary	of	War	Stanton’s	uneasiness	in	the	face	of	jurisdictional	challenges.	And	the	third	was	opposition	from	within	the	military	establishment.		
I.	Holt	and	Stanton’s	Cautiousness	Holt’s	consistent	belief	was	that	war	crimes	trials	needed	to	be	fair	in	order	to	serve	their	political	function.	Fair	trials	admitted	a	level	of	risk,	particularly	that	of	acquittal,	and	the	decision	to	prosecute	became	politically	useless	(or	dangerous)	if	the	risk	rose	above	a	certain	threshold.	Thus,	after	the	report	of	the	board	of	inquiry	in	November,	Holt	scrutinized	their	research	and	found	weaknesses	and	misinterpretations	in	their	case	for	indictment.	He	advised	Stanton	in	December	that	the	board’s	report	contained	“no	grounds	upon	which	personal	charges	could	be	established	and	sustained	against	the	guilty	parties.”169	Later	it	was	Stanton	who	refused	to	call	for	a	military	commission,	even	after	more	substantial	evidence	against	Pickett	was	uncovered.	Holt	recommended	twice	
																																																								167	It	was	a	border	state,	late	to	secede	and	with	a	slimmer	majority	than	in	the	Deep	South.	At	the	time	of	its	secession,	Lincoln	pushed	the	narrative	of	a	conspiracy	by	slave-holding	elites	against	popular	will.	On	whether	this	was	accurate,	see	James	M.	McPherson,	Battle	cry	of	freedom:	the	Civil	War	era,	The	Oxford	history	of	the	United	States,	(New	York	u.a.:	Oxford	Univ.	Press,	1988),	276-308.	168	"Ex.	Doc.	11,"		5.	169	"Exec.	Doc.	98,"		48-9.	
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that	Pickett	be	arraigned,170	but	Stanton	and	Holt,	while	remaining	politically	aligned,	had	begun	to	deviate	by	January	1866	on	the	issue	of	prosecutions.	For	instance,	Holt	was	of	the	firm	opinion	that	ex-Confederate	President	Jefferson	Davis	should	be	brought	before	a	military	commission	according	to	the	legal	framework	of	war	crimes.171	Stanton,	on	the	other	hand,	believed	along	with	Attorney	General	Speed	that	Davis	should	only	be	tried	in	a	civilian	court,	citing	concerns	about	jurisdictional	challenges.172	This	belief	was	further	cemented	by	the	Milligan	decision	and	Johnson’s	declaration	to	formally	end	the	war	in	spring	1866.	Although	Stanton	continued	to	support	the	military	commission	as	a	legal	enforcer	of	Reconstruction	in	the	South,173	he	apparently	lost	faith	in	war	crimes	tribunals’	ability	to	legitimate	this	legal	forum.174		
II.	Intervention	by	Grant	on	Pickett’s	Behalf	The	cautiousness	shown	first	by	Holt	and	later	by	Stanton	kept	the	prosecution	in	limbo.	Its	fate	was	decided	by	the	intervention	of	Ulysses	Grant.	The	basis	of	this	intervention	leads	us	back	to	the	convention	of	post-war	amnesty	that	the	pro-trial	faction	was	trying	to	undo.	Grant,	like	Sherman,	had	promoted	the	convention	by	offering	generous	terms	of	surrender	at	Appomattox,	and	the	terms	remained	“a	transcending	point	of	honor”	for	Grant,	“regardless	of	what	information	had	come	out	subsequently	about	the	conduct	of	the	Southern	officers	covered	by	them.”175	Grant	also	had	a	personal	relationship	with	Pickett	going	back	to	the	Mexican-
																																																								170	Ibid,	53-4;	"Ex.	Doc.	11,"		3.	171	Department,	Official	records,	2.8,	847-55.	172	Nicoletti,	Secession	on	trial,	142-3.	173	Vagts,	"Military	Commissions,"	269;	Stahr,	Stanton:	Lincoln's	war	secretary,	470.	174	Stanton	wrote	an	official	memo	in	July	1866	that	he	“has	not	felt	authorized	to	pursue	the	course	recommended	by	the	Judge	Advocate	General	[regarding	Pickett]	until	the	Supreme	Court	should	be	formally	promulgated.	The	magnitude	of	the	offence	alleged	against	Pickett	is	such	that	there	should	be	no	reason	to	contest	the	jurisdiction	of	the	tribunal.”	"Ex.	Doc.	11,"		3.	175	Gerard	A	Patterson,	Justice	Or	Atrocity:	General	George	E.	Pickett	and	the	Kinston,	
NC	Hangings	(Gettysburg,	PA:	Thomas,	1998),	128-9.	
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American	War.176	In	March	1866,	Grant	forwarded	Pickett’s	request	for	clemency	to	the	president,	in	which	Pickett	had	written	that	his	“action	was	sanctioned	by	the	then	confederate	government.”177	In	other	words,	his	commission	as	an	officer	shielded	him	from	criminal	prosecution.	Grant	appended	his	own	note	confirming	this	line	of	thinking:	“During	the	rebellion	belligerent	rights	were	acknowledged...	and	it	is	clear	to	me	that	the	parole	given	by	the	armies	laying	down	their	arms	protects	them	against	punishments	for	acts	lawful	for	any	other	belligerent.”178	While	Grant	could	not	unilaterally	block	the	prosecution,	historians	agree	that	this	intervention	was	crucial	in	keeping	Pickett	out	of	court.179		Kastenberg	has	shown	that	Grant,	in	his	early	promotion	of	a	quick	North-South	reconciliation,180	collided	on	at	least	four	different	occasions	with	Holt	over	the	war	crimes	prosecutions	of	former	Confederate	officers.181	His	boldest	action	came	in	the	summer	of	1865	after	a	grand	jury	indicted	over	thirty	top	Confederate	officials	for	treason.182	Grant	threatened	to	resign	if	these	men	were	arrested,	and	Johnson	apparently	bowed	to	his	threat.183	Grant’s	position	makes	clear	that	the	active	prevention	of	prosecutions	came	from	within	the	military	establishment	as	well	as	from	other	quarters	of	government.	It	underlines	the	reasons	why,	in	cases																																																									176	A	few	years	later,	Grant	offered	Pickett	public	office	in	Virginia.	Donald	E.	Collins,	"War	Crime	or	Justice?	General	George	Pickett	and	the	Mass	Execution	of	Deserters	in	Civil	War	Kinston,	North	Carolina,"	NCUV	Project	(1999).	http://homepages.rootsweb.com/~ncuv/kinston2.htm.	177	"Ex.	Doc.	11,"		8.	178	Grant	went	on	to	add	that	while	some	of	Pickett’s	decisions	were	reproachable,	“I	do	not	see	how	good,	either	to	the	friends	of	the	deceased	or	by	fixing	an	example	for	the	future,	can	be	secured	by	his	trial	now.”	Ibid,	8-9.	179	Patterson,	Justice	Or	Atrocity,	128;	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	264;	Collins,	"War	Crime	or	Justice?."	180	Brooks	Simpson	argues	that	Grant	later	turned	away	from	his	“somewhat	naive	optimism	about	the	regeneracy	of	Southern	loyalty.”	Reconstruction.	Brooks	D	Simpson,	Let	Us	Have	Peace:	Ulysses	S.	Grant	and	the	Politics	of	War	and	
Reconstruction,	1861-1868	(UNC	Press	Books,	2014),	116,	29-30.	181	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	265-6.	182	"Indictment	of	R.	E.	Lee	is	Found,"	New	York	Times	(New	York),	Jan.	8,	1937,	21,	https://nyti.ms/2XHR84r.	183	Simpson,	Let	Us	Have	Peace,	104-9;	William	A	Blair,	With	Malice	toward	Some:	
Treason	and	Loyalty	in	the	Civil	War	Era	(UNC	Press	Books,	2014),	241.	
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like	Pickett’s,	the	threshold	for	successfully	bringing	a	case	to	court	was	so	high.	It	required	firm	political	support,	and	this	was	something	that	wavered	over	time,	as	indicated	by	Stanton’s	increasing	reluctance	to	endorse	war	crimes	tribunals.		
THE	MERCER	AND	GEE	TRIALS	While	Pickett’s	prosecution	floundered,	two	trials	of	former	Confederate	officers	took	place	in	the	South.	Each	led	to	an	outright	victory	for	the	defense,	indicating	that	federal	prosecutors	had	not	rigged	the	commissions	and	that,	as	a	consequence,	the	didactic	function	they	envisioned	had	the	potential	to	backfire.	The	associated	political	risk,	in	addition	to	a	swell	of	jurisdictional	challenges	during	Gee,	indicated	that	further	prosecutions	would	flounder	in	the	manner	of	Pickett’s.		
I.	The	Mercer	Trial	At	the	turn	of	1866,	Brig.	Gen.	George	Mercer	was	charged	with	murder	for	allegedly	ordering	the	execution	of	seven	Union	POWs	after	a	summary	court-martial	in	Savannah,	GA.184	As	in	the	case	of	Pickett,	the	question	of	whether	these	were	in	fact	Union	POWs	was	up	for	debate.	According	to	the	charge,	they	had	been	“induced	to	enlist	in	the	army	of…the	so-called	Confederate	States	to	avoid	starvation”	in	the	camps;185	from	Mercer’s	standpoint,	they	were	turncoats	who	had	voluntarily	joined	Confederate	ranks.	Thus,	when	they	were	caught	trying	to	escape	to	Union	lines	as	Sherman’s	army	approached	in	December	1864,	Mercer	claimed	he	had	the	right	to	punish	them	as	deserters,	whereas	the	prosecutor	claimed	they	had	not	legitimately	joined	the	Confederate	army	and	were	thus	shielded	from	punishment	as	POWs.		
I.I.	The	Basis	of	Mercer’s	Acquittal	Considering	the	carefulness	with	which	Joseph	Holt	had	approached	Pickett’s	case,	the	arraignment	of	Mercer	is	somewhat	of	a	mystery.	After	the	proceedings	began	in																																																									184	The	following	is	based	on	Norman	Turner’s	compilation	of	the	Mercer	transcript.	Turner’s	work	can	be	obtained	from	the	Historical	Effingham	Society.	For	a	brief	summary	of	the	Dec.	1864	incident:	Turner,	"Confederate	Military	Executions,"	13-4.	185	Ibid,	18.	
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mid-December,	the	lead	prosecutor	(John	H.	Watrous)	had	to	ask	for	an	indefinite	delay	to	cull	more	witnesses	in	the	press.186	He	apparently	had	nothing	more	to	go	on	than	hearsay	testimony	from	Union	Gen.	W.	P.	Carlin,	whose	men	had	reported	on	the	incident	in	Savannah	the	previous	year	and	who	apparently	tried	to	get	the	charges	against	Mercer	dropped	before	the	trial	began.187		Once	the	proceedings	resumed	in	January,	the	prosecutor	was	able	to	present	eyewitnesses,	but	none	of	them	could	identify	Mercer	as	being	present	at	the	court-martial	in	question.188	The	defense,	on	the	other	hand,	offered	a	solid	alibi.	His	son,	an	officer	under	his	command,	stated	that	the	two	were	elsewhere	on	the	night	of	the	court-martial	and	only	heard	about	it	the	next	morning.189	After	a	few	more	examinations,	the	defense	counsel	stated	that	he	had	“intended	to	introduce	a	number	of	other	witnesses,	but…such	was	the	paucity	of	the	evidence	elicited	against	the	accused,	that	he	deemed	it	unnecessary	to	detain	the	Court	for	that	purpose.”	The	judge	advocate	agreed	to	close	without	final	arguments.	After	“very	brief	deliberation,”	the	commission	ruled	that	Mercer	was	not	guilty.190		
I.II.	The	Didactic	Function	Backfires	For	Holt,	who	directed	the	prosecution,	and	for	the	pro-trial	faction	more	generally,	
Mercer	turned	out	to	be	worse	than	a	mere	acquittal.	The	trial	received	national	news	coverage	and	the	full	transcript	was	published	piecemeal	in	the	Savannah	
Republican,	a	newspaper	that	had	been	installed	upon	the	military	capture	of	Savannah	and	was	funded	mainly	by	the	Union	War	Department—but	whose	editors	nonetheless	sympathized	with	the	defendant.191	The	framing	of	the	charges																																																									186	Ibid,	16-17,	24-25.	187	Ibid,	21,	24.	188	One	even	stated,	”[Mercer]	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	execution,	to	my	knowledge.”	See	examinations	of	McQuade,	Schenck,	and	Evans,	respectively,	at	ibid,	25-9,	30-1,	and	32-3.	189	Ibid,	35.	190	Ibid,	36.	191	Richard	H.	Abbott,	"The	Republican	Party	Press	in	Reconstruction	Georgia,	1867-1874,"	The	Journal	of	Southern	History	61,	no.	4	(1995):	726.	The	editors	of	the	
Savannah	Republican	wrote	that	“many	of	our	citizens,	who	can	not	politically	
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clearly	indicates	that	the	prosecution	intended	to	tie	Mercer	into	the	broader	narrative	of	POW	abuse.	The	victims	had	been	recruited	from	some	of	the	worst	camps	in	the	South;	they	were	faced	with	the	choice	of	switching	sides	or	remaining	there	to	starve;	in	the	end,	they	were	cruelly	punished	for	trying	to	their	own	ranks.	So	went	the	intended	narrative.	The	defense	successfully	flipped	it	on	its	head.		Some	papers	in	the	South	wrote	editorials	ridiculing	the	prosecution,192	but	ultimately	it	sufficed	to	publish	excerpts	of	court	testimony.	One	defense	witness	was	stationed	at	Florence,	S.	Carolina,	one	of	the	camps	where	the	turncoats	were	recruited.	He	testified	that	those	who	agreed	to	switch	sides	“said	they	were	fooled	into	service	[in	the	Union	army].	That	they	were	often	drugged	and	found	themselves	enlisted	on	recovering.”193	One	prosecution	witness,	on	cross-examination,	was	asked	about	his	time	as	a	POW:	“Were	you	not	much	disappointed	and	dissatisfied	when	you	learned	that	your	Government	would	not	make	an	exchange?”	The	witness	responded,	“Yes	sir:	it	was	circulated	among	us	that	[Union	leaders]	would	not	exchange	sound	men	for	skeletons.”194	Furthermore,	Mercer’s	son	testified	that,	on	the	night	of	the	court-martial,	the	battalion	of	turncoats	was	“alarmed,	fearing	that	they	would	be	summarily	dealt	with	by	General	Sherman	if	they	should	be	captured	in	arms.”195	So	went	the	counter-narrative:	the	escape	was	not	an	act	of	loyalty,	but	one	of	fear	of	Union	reprisals;	the	original	enlistment	of	the	Union	POWs	in	the	rebel	army	was	not	an	act	of	desperation,	but	one	of	free	will.	Mercer	was	a	general,	the	highest-ranking	Confederate	officer	to	come	before	a	court	after	the	war.	It	is	uncertain	to	what	extent	this	legal	event	influenced	Northern	leaders—existing	research	on	Mercer	is	particularly	scarce—but	the	success	of	the	defense	in	publicizing	anti-Union	polemics	could	only	have	deepened	the	squeamishness	among	those	who	continued	to	back	war	crimes	trials.	Added	to																																																																																																																																																																						affiliate	with	the	General,	believe	him	to	be	innocent	and	are	sanguine	that	a	fair	and	impartial	trial,	such	as	the	General	will	surely	have,	will	surely	prove	the	falsity	of	the	charges.”	Turner,	"Confederate	Military	Executions,"	22.	192	Ibid,	36-7.	193	Ibid,	33-4.	194	Ibid,	28-9.	195	He	even	claimed	that	Gen.	Mercer	had	made	extra	provisions	for	the	men’s	protection	from	Sherman’s	forces.	Ibid,	35-6.	
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this	was	the	fact	that	jurisdiction,	which	was	not	heavily	debated	in	Mercer,	again	came	into	doubt	during	Gee,	which	began	the	following	month.	Jurisdictional	uncertainty,	compounded	by	the	growing	assertiveness	of	anti-trial	forces	and	the	repeated	failure	of	prosecutors	to	deliver	a	Reconstruction-friendly	narrative,	was	perhaps	decisive	in	preventing	further	defendants	from	facing	war	crimes	charges.		
II.	The	Gee	Trial	In	terms	of	the	spectacle	and	the	horror	of	the	crimes	alleged,	Gee	came	closer	to	the	scale	of	Wirz.	The	commission	was	in	session	for	nearly	four	months,	from	February	to	June	1866,	in	Raleigh,	N.C.196	The	most	in-depth	media	coverage	appeared	in	the	South,	where	editorials	and	reprints	of	court	testimony	ran	frequently.	Northern	papers	also	printed	features	and	periodic	updates;	the	New	York	Herald,	a	leading	Republican	newspaper,	kept	a	correspondent	in	Raleigh.197	The	defendant,	former	Confederate	major	and	prison	commandant	John	Gee,	was	accused	of	criminally	neglecting	the	prisoners	at	Salisbury,	where	the	POW	death	rate	was	roughly	25%.	Gee	also	faced	seven	counts	of	murder,	each	for	ordering	inferiors	to	fire	on	POWs.		After	hearing	46	witnesses	for	the	prosecution	and	69	for	the	defense,	the	counsel	called	for	an	end	to	the	proceedings.	“We	cannot	present	to	this	commission	a	stronger	argument	of	the	innocence	of	the	accused	than	the	record	of	the	evidence	before	you,”	he	stated.	He	then	requested	to	proceed	to	the	verdict	without	closing	arguments.	Like	in	Mercer,	the	lead	prosecutor	(Francis	E.	Wolcott)	consented.198	The	commission	announced	that	it	found	the	defendant	not	guilty	on	all	counts.199	In	the	following,	I	will	argue—as	I	did	for	Wirz	and	Mercer—that	beyond	any	political	circumstance	or	hidden	motivation,	the	most	plausible	explanation	for	the																																																									196	The	following	is	based	on	a	republication	of	the	trial	transcript	compiled	and	edited	by	Annette	Ford.	It	runs	roughly	600	pages.	Ford,	The	captive.	197	Ibid,	589.	For	an	example	of	Northern	coverage,	see	"The	Horrors	of	Salisbury	Prison,"	New	York	Times	(New	York),	Mar.	2,	1866	1866,	https://nyti.ms/2JwJFzO.	198	Ford,	The	captive,	568.	199	The	commission	stated	that	they	“attach[ed]	no	responsibility	[to	Gee]…	other	than	for	weakness	in	retaining	position	when	unable	to	carry	out	the	dictates	of	humanity,	and	[believed]	that	higher	authorities	of	the	Rebel	Government	were	fully	responsible	for	all	the	alleged	violations	of	the	Laws	and	Customs	of	War.”	Ibid,	569.	
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verdict	is	the	respective	strength	of	the	cases	made	by	prosecution	and	defense.	Due	process	itself,	through	the	magnifying	glass	of	publicity,	was	the	means	by	which	political	ends	were	sought.	With	a	mind	to	identifying	these	ends,	there	are	two	points	I	want	to	emphasize	about	Gee.	The	first	relates	to	the	formulation	of	charges,	which	made	no	reference	to	a	conspiracy.	The	effort	to	implicate	the	Confederate	leadership	more	generally,	and	thus	the	broader	investigative	element	of	Wirz,	was	abandoned	in	Gee.	The	second	relates	to	jurisdiction.	Gee	bore	a	particularly	clear	connection	to	Reconstruction	debates	over	the	right	of	military	courts	to	try	citizens	in	the	South,	where	local	courts	were	not	trusted	with	handling	certain	types	of	proceedings.	Here,	the	circular	function	of	war	crimes	trials—a	court	legitimizing	its	own	right	to	exist—and	the	political	stakes	of	this	self-legitimation	come	into	focus.		
II.I.	The	Basis	of	Gee’s	Acquittal	As	in	Wirz,	the	first	charge	against	Gee	concerned	his	responsibility	at	a	systemic	level,	relative	to	his	standing	as	camp	commandant.	Major	Gee,	the	charge	read,	“fully	clothed	in	authority	and	in	duty	bound	to	treat,	and	care	and	provide	for	said	prisoners…	did	willfully	and	maliciously,	and	in	violation	of	the	laws	and	usage	of	civilized	warfare,	utterly	fail	and	neglect	to	provide,…	or	attempt	to	have	provided”	sufficient	rations,	clothing,	fuel,	shelter,	water,	or	hospital	attendance.	As	a	result,	“twelve	hundred	per	month,	whose	names	are	unknown,	died	from	disease,	starvation	and	exposure.”200	The	term	“clothed	in	authority”—meaning	that	the	defendant	was	a	commissioned	Confederate	officer,	thus	subject	to	international	norms—also	appeared	in	the	charge	against	Wirz,	as	did	similar	counts	of	neglect.	Yet	the	charge	was	not	framed	in	terms	of	a	conspiracy	with	higher	officials,	in	part	because	of	the	War	Department’s	ultimate	failure	to	dig	up	sufficient	evidence	on	this	account.201																																																									200	Ibid,	11-12.	201	The	War	Department	had	created	an	archive	of	Confederate	documents	to	this	end,	a	project	that	ultimately	struggled	to	prove	anything	more	than	Confederate	officials’	unresponsiveness	to	internal	complaints.	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	318;	Carl	L.	Lokke,	"The	Captured	Confederate	Records	under	Francis	Lieber,"	The	American	
Archivist	9,	no.	4	(1946).	
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As	a	result,	the	ill-defined	functional	split	in	Wirz	between	trial	court	and	fact-finding	commission	was	eliminated,	leaving	only	an	examination	of	prison	conditions	and	how	they	related	to	Gee’s	personal	actions.	In	other	words,	the	absence	of	a	conspiracy	in	the	charges	allowed	the	judges	to	establish	a	clear	perimeter	around	admissible	evidence.	A	major	effect	of	this	perimeter	was	that	it	prevented	the	defense	from	using	the	court	to	promote	anti-Union	narratives.	For	instance,	the	commission	sustained	the	judge	advocate’s	decision	to	block	subpoenas	of	Robert	Ould,	the	Confederate	exchange	commissioner,	and	Robert	E.	Lee,	the	same	men	whom	Wirz’s	counsel	had	attempted	to	subpoena.202	The	difference	with	Wirz	was	that	Gee’s	prosecutor,	like	his	counsel,	was	also	held	back	from	delving	into	questions	that	were	not	explicitly	laid	out	in	the	charges.203	If	Gee’s	responsibility	as	commandant	was	to	ensure	a	tolerable	standard	of	living	for	prisoners,	he	clearly	failed.	Salisbury	had	the	highest	mortality	rate	of	all	POW	camps	in	the	Civil	War.204	The	sanitary	conditions	and	the	quality	of	food	were	abysmal,	and	the	prisoners	lived	in	literal	holes	in	the	ground	through	the	winter.205	However,	the	defense	demonstrated	that	these	issues	were	out	of	Gee’s	control.		What	really	separated	their	work	from	Wirz’s	defense	team,	which	also	showed	that	Confederate	systems	of	transport,	supplies,	and	bureaucracy	were	dysfunctional,206	was	the	amount	of	evidence	they	brought	proving	the	intensity	of	Gee’s	objections	to	prison	conditions.	A	number	of	credible	witnesses	testified	that	Gee	complained	to	superiors	formally	and	informally,	with	great	insistence	and	on	many	occasions,	suggesting	more	humane	alternatives	of	confinement.207	Furthermore,	unlike	at																																																									202	Ibid,	521.	In	another	instance,	when	the	defense	counsel	prompted	a	witness	to	fault	Union	Secretary	of	War	Stanton	for	the	breakdown	of	prisoner	exchanges,	the	commission	sustained	an	objection	by	the	judge	advocate.	Ibid,	187.	203	See	the	successful	objection	by	counsel	at	ibid,	24.	204	McPherson,	Battle	cry	of	freedom,	797-802.	205	See	descriptions	of	prison	conditions	in	the	testimonies	of	Ireland,	Barnes,	and	Davis,	starting	respectively	at	Ford,	The	captive,	78,	150,	87.	The	total	lack	of	shelter	was	revealed	to	be	the	consequence	of	a	special	order	given	by	Gen.	Winder.	See	testimony	of	Brig.	Gen.	Johnson,	starting	at	ibid,	513. 206	See	the	string	of	testimonies	at	ibid,	346-422.	207	See	testimonies	of	Lyerly,	M.C.	Davis,	Dr.	Howerton,	Baxter,	Fuqua,	James	Best,	and	Stockton,	starting	respective	at	ibid,	31,	44,	57,	209,	239,	488,	and	495. 
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Andersonville,	there	was	no	evidence	of	a	cruel	system	of	punishment.	Witnesses	testified	that	Gee	never	punished	POWs	for	escaping	and	that	his	first	reaction	upon	their	return	was	always	to	get	them	rations.208	A	guard	testified	that	Gee	threatened	him	with	punishment	for	mistreating	POWs,	and	many	other	testimonies	described	acts	that	substantiated	Gee’s	concern	for	the	prisoners’	welfare.209	Furthermore,	the	defense	successfully	cast	all	the	murder	allegations	into	doubt.	Three	counts	received	the	most	attention.210	The	first	was	the	shooting	of	a	Union	officer	on	the	edge	of	camp	while	he	went	to	urinate,	which	nearly	all	witnesses	agreed	was	unwarranted.211	No	one	claimed,	however,	that	Gee	was	on	site.	One	POW	who	worked	at	camp	headquarters	testified	that	Gee	attempted	to	reward	the	responsible	guard,	but	his	credibility	was	seriously	undermined	in	cross-examination.212	Multiple	witnesses—including	Union	and	Confederate	officers—testified	that	Gee	showed	remorse	after	learning	of	the	incident,	and	one	Confederate	official	testified	that,	due	to	the	ambiguity	of	the	deadline	where	the	lieutenant	was	shot,	Gee	had	no	legal	basis	to	punish	the	guard.213		A	second	count	alleged	that	Gee	ordered	POWs	to	be	shot	after	a	chimney	collapsed	in	one	of	the	camp’s	main	buildings	and	prisoners	gathered	chaotically	near	the	entrance.	The	primary	prosecution	witness,	a	Northern	reporter	interned	at	Salisbury,	testified	in	cross-examination	that	Gee’s	order	to	forcefully	disperse	the	crowd	was	probably	for	the	purpose	of	saving	those	under	the	ruins.214		
																																																								208	See	testimonies	of	Fuqua,	David	Martin,	Duke,	and	Stockton,	starting	respectively	at	ibid,	239,	443-4,	481,	495.	209	See	testimony	of	David	Martin:	ibid,	starting	at	445.	See	also	testimony	that	Gee	interfered	to	stop	abuse	by	a	recruiter;	that	Gee	requested	to	build	a	bakery	and	started	work	without	official	approval;	that	he	badgered	the	quartermaster	as	many	as	3	daily	to	get	more	straw	for	POWs:	starting	respectively	at	ibid,	134,	332,	545.	210	The	other	murders	either	had	no	clear	link	to	Gee,	or	the	witnesses	arrived	after	the	fact,	with	little	knowledge	of	the	circumstances.	See,	e.g.,	testimony	on	the	murder	of	Moses	Smith,	a	black	POW,	by	prosecution	witnesses	W.	E.	Davis	and	J.	Browne,	starting	respectively	at	ibid,	187,	173.	211	For	a	summary,	see	the	testimony	of	another	POW	officer	at	ibid,	74-5.	212	Ibid,	97-105.	213	See	testimonies	of	Gault	and	Fuqua,	starting	respectively	at	ibid,	156,	239.	214	See	testimony	of	W.	E.	Davis,	starting	at	ibid,	187.	
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The	third	and	most	serious	allegation	concerned	a	small	“disturbance”—to	quote	the	charges—in	camp	that	“could	have	[been]	quelled	and	terminated...by	the	use	of	moderate	force,”	but	in	response	to	which	Gee	ordered	“the	entire	prison	guard	to	fire	upon	the	mass	of	prisoners	in	the	enclosure...indiscriminately,"	causing	ten	POWs	to	be	killed	and	numerous	others	to	be	seriously	wounded.215	While	it	was	confirmed	that	ten	POWs	died	and	that	53	were	wounded,	testimonies	revealed	that	“disturbance”	was	an	understatement:	30	to	40	POWs	successfully	disarmed	around	20	guards	and	threatened	to	set	a	camp-wide	breakout	in	motion.216	Gee	himself	was	the	one	who	ordered	the	ceasefire,217	and	was	successful	in	doing	so	even	though	citizens	from	Salisbury	had	arrived	amid	the	chaos	with	“a	very	decided	disposition	to	keep	up	the	firing	on	the	prisoners.”218		
II.II.	The	Didactic	Function	of	Gee	Leaving	the	issue	of	jurisdiction	aside,	all	indicators	point	to	the	fact	that	Gee’s	due	process	rights	were	respected	by	the	commission.	As	I	argue	for	Wirz	and	Mercer,	the	judges’	verdict	in	Gee	is	most	plausibly	explained	by	their	weighing	of	evidence	in	the	courtroom—at	the	very	least	a	process	clear	from	any	corruption,	but	arguably	also	reflecting	a	sincere,	intelligent	effort	to	evaluate	the	facts.	To	make	this	argument	does	not	imply	that	the	decision	to	bring	charges	was	impartial.	The	prosecutor	and	those	who	selectively	ordered	the	prosecution	doubtlessly	thought	they	could	get	the	accused	convicted	and	thereby	damage	the	reputation	of	the	former	Confederate	leadership.	In	Gee,	this	expectation	was	reasonable	given	the	severity	of	conditions	at	Salisbury	and	of	the	accusations	made	against	the	defendant.	Gee’s	defense	team	simply	outclassed	the	prosecutor,	furnishing	evidence	that	Holt	and	others	were	not	aware	of	when	they	ordered	the	trial.	One	should	also	keep	in	mind	that	there	was	a	political	purpose	beyond	conviction	or	acquittal	that	the	prosecution	served	for	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice.																																																									215	Ibid,	11-12.	216	See	in	particular	testimonies	beginning	at	ibid,	171,	187,	and	239.	217	See	testimonies	starting	at	ibid,	290,	443.	218	Quote	from	ibid,	239;	see	confirming	testimonies	starting	at	ibid,	312,	448.	
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This	was	to	lend	credence	to	the	claim	that,	contrary	to	the	accusation	of	arbitrary	rule	and	unconstitutional	legal	practices,	military	commissions	were	fair	and	necessary	to	handle	certain	cases	in	the	South	(here,	war	crimes)	for	which	the	civil	courts	were	ill-equipped.	Consider	that	a	Floridian	paper—one	that	helped	fundraise	for	Gee’s	defense	and	that	promoted	anti-Union	narratives	during	the	trial—published	the	following	commentary	after	a	few	weeks	of	proceedings:	The	idea	is	that…	[Gee	was	really]	convicted	before	trial	and	that	the	trial	is	but	a	mere	form.	This	prevalent	notion	is	erroneous	and	absurd.	Several	of	the	points	presented	by	[counsel]	have	been	sustained	and	the	Judge	Advocate	overruled,	showing	that	the	Commission	at	least,	whatever	may	be	thought	of	the	witnesses,	are	not	influenced	by	prejudice.			 It	is	unclear	how	much	Gee	functioned	to	change	Southern	minds	about	the	legitimacy	of	military	courts,	but	this	was	certainly	part	of	the	trial’s	intended	function.	War	crimes	tribunals	were	not	only	designed	to	shape	the	memory	of	the	war	and	perceptions	of	Confederate	character;	they	were	also	part	of	a	legal-institutional	battle	between	military	and	civil	courts,	the	former	enforcing	federal	law	where	the	latter	sought	to	preserve	the	legal	customs	of	the	state.	More	than	at	any	point	in	Wirz	and	Mercer,	this	element	of	the	political	relevance	of	war	crimes	for	Reconstruction	came	into	exceptional	focus	in	Gee.		
II.III.	Jurisdiction:	The	Resurgence	of	Immunity	At	the	opening	of	the	trial,	Gee’s	counsel	challenged	the	court’s	jurisdiction	in	a	manner	similar	to	Mercer	and	Wirz’s	counsels	before	him:	the	defendant,	he	argued,	was	guarded	from	arrest	by	his	parole,	which	followed	from	the	Sherman-Johnston	surrender.219	In	response,	the	judge	advocate	pointed	to	Wirz	as	“a	direct	parallel”	and	thus	a	“precedent”	for	military	commissions’	legal	cognizance	of	such	cases.220																																																									219	Ibid,	14-16.	220	The	counsel	stated,	citing	Vattel’s	Law	of	Nations,	that	a	commander	has	the	power	to	agree	to	an	enemy’s	terms	of	surrender	“and	his	sovereign	cannot	annul	them.”	The	judge	advocate	rebutted	with	another	citation	of	Vattel	that	surrender	terms	could	only	protect	acts	“in	strict	conformity	with	the	laws	and	customs	of	war.”	Ibid,	14-16.	
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The	commission	agreed	with	him.	They	gave	a	formal	opinion	that	echoed	Art.	59	of	Gen.	Orders	100:	“a	prisoner	of	war	is	not	protected	from	the	punishment	of	crimes	committed	in	violation	of	the	laws	and	customs	of	war…	for	which	he	has	not	already	been	punished	by	his	own	authorities.”221	Guénaël	Mettraux	has	called	this	“a	principled	stance	against	the	possibility	of	providing	immunity	to	those	who	committed	war	crimes	through	pardons	and	paroles.”222	The	legal	infrastructure	of	Wirz	and	Mercer	remained	intact	in	late	February	1866,	rooted	in	the	extension	of	executive	war	powers.	By	the	time	Gee	got	underway,	however,	this	source	of	authorization	had	grown	precarious.	The	president	himself	was	rapidly	and	continually	granting	pardons	to	former	Confederates	and	intervening	in	legal	actions	against	alleged	war	criminals.223	More	importantly,	a	few	days	before	Gee	began,	Johnson	vetoed	a	renewal	of	the	Freedmen’s	Bureau	Bill,	which	sought	to	keep	military	jurisdiction	valid	across	the	former	Confederacy	to	assist	federal	agencies	in	locally	implementing	Reconstruction	reforms.224	Mercer	and	Gee	came	under	the	same	jurisdictional	umbrella.	Continuing	his	attack	on	military	jurisdiction,	President	Johnson	declared	on	April	2nd	that	the	Confederate	insurrection	was	at	a	formal	end,	adding	specifically	that	“…military	occupation,	martial	law,	military	tribunals,	and	the	suppression	of	the	writ	of	habeas	corpus	are	in	times	of	peace	dangerous	to	public	liberty….”225	This	was	Johnson’s	bow	out	of	Reconstruction.	Congress	would	go	on	to	successfully	respond	by	making	themselves	the	source	of	legal	authorization	for																																																									221	Ibid,	21.	222	Guénaël	Mettraux,	"A	Little-known	Case	from	the	American	Civil	War:	The	War	Crimes	Trial	of	Major	General	John	H.	Gee,"	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	8,	no.	4	(2010).	223	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	307-8.	224	Johnson	emphasized	in	his	response	to	the	bill	that	allowing	military	courts	to	try	citizens	in	the	South	was	a	violation	of	their	rights	according	to	the	5th	and	6th	Amendments.	Andrew	Johnson,	"Veto	Message	on	Freedmen	and	Refugee	Relief	Bureau	Legislation,"	(1866).	https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/february-19-1866-veto-message-freedmen-and-refugee-relief.	225	Andrew	Johnson,	"Proclamation	Declaring	the	Insurrection	at	an	End,"	The	
Harvard	Classics:	American	Historical	Documents	(1866).	https://www.bartleby.com/43/42.html.	
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Reconstruction,	passing	the	Civil	Rights	Act	and	Freedmen’s	Bureau	Bill	later	that	spring	and	providing	support	for	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice.226	The	specific	issue	of	war	crimes	prosecutions,	however,	would	not	survive	the	transition	from	Presidential	to	Congressional	Reconstruction.	The	April	2nd	proclamation	nearly	stopped	the	Gee	trial	in	its	tracks.	About	a	week	later,	Daniel	Fowle,	a	N.	Carolina	state	superior	court	judge,	issued	a	writ	of	
habeas	corpus	for	Gee,	demanding	that	the	military	authorities	turn	him	over	to	civilian	authorities.227	The	Supreme	Court	had	also	announced	its	Milligan	decision	the	day	after	Johnson’s	proclamation.228	The	Court	held	that	military	commissions	could	no	longer	try	citizens	in	states	that	did	not	secede.	While	Milligan	had	no	direct	bearing	on	the	South	and	while	Johnson’s	proclamation	did	not	effectively	cease	military	rule,	the	two	together	apparently	emboldened	Judge	Fowle	to	intervene	in	Gee.	After	the	commanding	officer	in	N.	Carolina,	General	Ruger,	refused	to	comply,	the	judge	ordered	his	arrest.	The	general	would	not	submit.	Meanwhile,	the	commission	proceeded,	and	Judge	Fowle	hoped	for	an	intervention	from	President	Johnson	on	his	behalf.229	Two	weeks	after	his	intervention,	Fowle	backed	down.	The	White	House	announced	that	since	the	trial	began	before	April	2nd,	it	should	continue	until	it	reached	a	verdict.	That	said,	as	the	New	York	Times	reported,	the	president	ordered	them	“not	to	pass	sentence	in	the	case,	but	to	send	the	full	record	of	the	proceedings	in	the	trial,	when	it	shall	be	concluded,	to	Washington,	to	enable	the	Government	to	
																																																								226	The	Act	of	March	2,	1867,	passed	over	Johnson's	veto,	secured	the	right	of	federal	officers	to	constitute	military	commissions,	“and	all	interference,	under	color	of	State	authority	with	the	exercise	of	military	authority	under	this	act,	shall	be	null	and	void.”	Vagts,	"Military	Commissions,"	245.	See	also	supra	note	60	and	Hart,	"Military	Commissions	and	the	Lieber	Code,"	67.	227	For	a	summary	of	the	incident,	see	Bradley,	Bluecoats	and	Tar	Heels,	109-10.	As	it	surfaces	in	the	trial	transcript,	and	for	related	primary	sources	compiled	by	Ford,	see	Ford,	The	captive,	7-9,	171-2.	228	Gee’s	counsel	brought	it	up	in	court	on	April	11th,	demanding	for	the	second	time	that	the	trial	be	stopped.	Having	already	received	one	go-ahead	from	Gen.	Ruger,	the	commission	overruled	the	motion	without	comment.	Ford,	The	captive,	179.	229	Bradley,	Bluecoats	and	Tar	Heels,	109-10.	
	 61	
act	understandingly	in	the	whole	matter,”230	which	may	indicate	that	the	president	would	have	shown	leniency	if	Gee	were	found	guilty.	Spaulding	writes	of	Milligan	that	its	“endorsement	of	civil	liberty”	was	favorable	to	“southern	sympathizers	and	opponents	of	Reconstruction….”231	State-level	legal	authorities	in	the	South	understood	the	Milligan	decision	as	well	as	the	April	2nd	proclamation	as	tokens	of	encouragement	to	reclaim	the	broad	legal	discretion	granted	to	them	in	the	Constitution.	From	the	former	Confederate	perspective,	the	defense	of	“civil	liberty”	meant	a	return	to	an	antebellum	status	quo	(minimally	accounting	for	the	13th	Amendment).	On	the	other	hand,	from	a	pro-Reconstruction	perspective,	the	violation	of	this	status	quo—of	racially	exclusive	civil	liberty—was	seen	as	necessary	in	order	to	install	universal	civil	liberty.	Gee	was	caught	up	in	this	confrontation.	Gen.	Ruger,	who	ordered	Gee	as	well	as	the	court	of	inquiry	for	Pickett	the	previous	fall,	saw	the	“restraining	influence	of	prompt	trial	and	punishment…	by	military	commissions	[as]	the	only	adequate	remedy	for	the	existing	evils”	in	the	area.232	Judge	Fowle,	in	his	attempt	to	regain	civilian	control	of	the	state	legal	system,	repeatedly	locked	horns	with	Ruger	on	this	account.233	
Gee,	like	Wirz	and	Mercer,	was	a	trial	designed	to	operate	on	two	didactic	wavelengths.	Hoping	for	a	conviction,	the	prosecutors	tried	to	discredit	the	former	Confederate	leadership	on	a	moral	level.	They	also	sought	to	exploit	and,	in	the	best	case,	strengthen	the	jurisdictional	footing	of	military	courts.	Their	jurisdiction	rested	upon	the	argument	that	although	Southerners’	citizenship	was	restored,	their																																																									230	"The	Gee	Trial,"	New	York	Times	(New	York),	Apr.	30,	1866	1866,	https://nyti.ms/2Sk1SEw.	231	Spaulding,	"The	Discourse	of	Law,"	2006.	232	Vagts,	"Military	Commissions,"	241-2.	233	In	early	1866,	military	officials	in	N.	Carolina	attempted	to	stop	the	traditional	punishment	of	whipping.	In	advocating	for	its	abolition,	one	officer	argued	that	although	“the	law	makes	no	distinction	on	account	of	color,[…]	in	the	practical	application	colored	men	are	publicly	whipped	and	white	men	discharged	on	the	payment	of	a	small	fine.”	In	this	dispute,	Ruger	bowed	to	Fowle’s	defense	of	whipping	on	the	grounds	of	its	theoretical	racial	neutrality.	In	another	such	confrontation	the	next	year,	Fowle	resigned	in	protest	of	the	military’s	removal	of	a	state	law	requiring	jurors	to	hold	property,	a	qualification	that	excluded	most	blacks	and	impoverished	whites.	Bradley,	Bluecoats	and	Tar	Heels,	114-15,	39,	62.	
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participation	in	the	rebellion	required	them	to	submit	to	a	special	form	of	accountability	in	the	form	of	direct	federal	rule.	At	the	ground	level,	figures	like	Judge	Fowle,	who	was	formerly	a	Confederate	general234	and	whose	moral	standing	was	thus	implicitly	under	attack,	battled	against	this	form	of	accountability.	Johnson	helped	them	to	this	end	by	issuing	a	series	of	amnesty	proclamations,	culminating	in	1868	with	a	universal	pardon.235	While	military	Reconstruction	continued	without	presidential	backing,	the	program	of	prosecuting	war	criminals	specifically,	which	the	president	could	unilaterally	obstruct	through	pardons	and	the	system	of	military	court	review,	seemed	to	collapse	halfway	through	the	third	and	final	trial	of	a	former	Confederate	officer.	Furthermore,	the	acquittal	of	this	officer	that	summer,	which	some	in	the	press	interpreted	as	a	“vindication	of	the	South,”236	must	have	left	many	supporters	of	war	crimes	prosecutions	wondering	why	to	continue	with	this	unruly	and	unprecedented	form	of	political	justice.		
CONCLUSION	Three	former	Confederate	officers	were	tried	for	war	crimes	in	1865	and	‘66.	The	first	(Capt.	Wirz)	was	convicted	and	sentenced	to	death	by	hanging.	The	second	two	(Brig.	Gen.	Mercer	and	Maj.	Gee)	were	acquitted.	These	appear	to	be	the	first	trials	in	modern	history	where	a	government	tried	officers	of	an	enemy	army	for	violating	international	customs	of	war.	Here	I	have	offered	an	integrative	analysis	of	all	three	trial	transcripts.	By	way	of	the	transcripts	and	scholarship	on	the	legal	and	political	battles	of	early	Reconstruction,	I	have	explored	what	it	was	the	prosecuting	party	was	after	and	the	extent	to	which	the	unfolding	of	the	trials	met	or	broke	from	their	intentions.	Doing	so	offers	a	strong	indication	of	what	allowed	these	unprecedented	trials	to	take	place;	at	the	same	time,	it	suggests	what	made	the	federal	government	abort	its	broader	prosecutorial	program	after	only	three	trials. 
																																																								234	Jerry	L.	Cross,	"Daniel	Gould	Fowle,"	(2006).	https://www.ncpedia.org/biography/governors/fowle.	235	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	223-5.	236	Ford,	The	captive,	592.	
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Historiography	on	the	topic	has	revolved	almost	exclusively	around	Wirz	and	is	dominated	by	what	I	call	the	revisionist	lineage.	The	revisionists	argue	that	Wirz	was	a	legal	farce	intended	to	appease	the	Northern	public’s	calls	for	revenge.	Breaking	from	this	narrative,	and	re-contextualizing	the	trial	alongside	Mercer	and	
Gee	as	well	as	the	near-trial	of	Pickett,	I	conclude	that	Wirz	was	in	fact	conducted	with	a	genuine	concern	for	due	process.	My	analysis	of	the	transcript	did	indicate	factors	of	bias	that	undermined	the	trial’s	appearance	of	even-handedness,	particularly	in	regard	to	its	broader	fact-finding	investigation.	All	the	same,	I	found	that	Wirz’s	guilty	verdict	was	primarily	a	function	of	the	evidence	brought	forward	in	court.	This	was	also	the	case	for	the	acquittals	of	Mercer	and	Gee.	That	all	three	trials	were	generally	fair	to	the	defendants	is	essential	to	reconstructing	their	political	intent.	On	the	one	hand,	those	who	designed	and	ordered	the	prosecutions	sought	convictions,	hoping	to	damage	the	reputation	of	the	Confederate	leadership	and	thus	galvanize	popular	support	in	the	North	and	acquiescence	among	southern	whites	for	military	Reconstruction.	On	the	other	hand,	for	this	message	to	be	successfully	conveyed,	the	trials	had	to	be	seen	as	credible	in	the	public	eye.	As	a	consequence,	those	who	oversaw	the	prosecutions	understood	that	introducing	the	risk	of	acquittal	was	necessary	to	bring	war	crimes	charges	to	court,	and	their	hesitance	to	arraign	Pickett,	despite	a	court	of	inquiry’s	recommendation	in	November	1865,	highlights	this	fact.	The	ability	to	bring	charges	in	spite	of	a	long-standing	tradition	of	post-war	immunity	rested	upon	several	enabling	factors.	The	first	was	that,	on	a	scale	never	seen	before,	the	Union	army	had	codified	the	laws	of	war	and	developed	a	bureaucracy	and	court-system	to	adjudicate	them.	As	regular	criminal	courts	were	not	equipped	to	hear	these	cases,	the	institutional	build-up	of	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice	over	the	course	of	the	war	supplied	the	necessary	legal	infrastructure.	The	other	enablements	arose	from	the	nature	of	the	war	itself,	which	was	formalized	in	the	fashion	of	an	international	conflict	but	remained	nonetheless	a	civil	war.	This	meant	that,	in	the	wake	of	the	conflict,	all	enemy	soldiers	and	officials	fell	into	the	permanent	custody	of	the	federal	government.	At	the	same	time,	because	the	war	
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was	not	officially	declared	over,	military	court	jurisdiction	could	remain	in	place	and	ex-Confederate	soldiers	could	be	tried	according	to	international	law. In	order	for	this	legal	infrastructure	to	remain	intact	through	the	transition	to	peacetime,	prosecutors	relied	on	executive	war	powers.	This	proved	an	unsteady	source	of	authorization,	as	the	postwar	agenda	of	President	Johnson	strayed	quickly	from	that	of	the	prosecutors	in	the	War	Department’s	justice	bureau.	When	Johnson—aided	by	the	civilian	legal	authorities	at	the	state	and	Supreme	Court	levels—de-authorized	military	courts	in	the	middle	of	the	Gee	trial,	the	Bureau	of	Military	Justice	was	able	to	readjust	to	secure	Congressional	authorization	for	its	general	operations	in	the	South.	In	the	process,	however,	their	ability	to	prosecute	ex-Confederates	for	wartime	violations	diminished.	Furthermore,	figures	within	the	federal	military	establishment	were	working	to	prevent	further	prosecutions.	This	is	illustrated	by	Ulysses	Grant’s	successful	intervention	on	behalf	of	Pickett.	The	Bureau	prosecutors’	consecutive	defeats	in	Mercer	and	Gee	also	played	a	role	in	preventing	further	trials.	Even	to	the	extent	they	demonstrated	that	war	crimes	commissions	were	not	rigged,	they	backfired	on	the	other	didactic	goal	of	discrediting	the	Confederacy	through	convictions.	Prosecutors	had	chosen	to	highlight	the	issue	of	POW	camps	specifically,	likely	because	they	considered	white-on-white	crimes	the	best	topic	to	provoke	outrage	among	Northern	and	Southern	whites.	In	the	end,	the	prosecutors’	intended	message	was	not	clearly	conveyed	by	the	proceedings.	The	ex-Confederate	officers	came	across	as	having	served	honorably,	and	their	trials	occasionally	held	out	opportunities	for	the	defense	to	blame	Union	leaders	for	the	POW	crisis.	In	this	way,	one	of	the	essential	justifications	for	charging	ex-Confederates	with	war	crimes	was	cast	into	doubt.	Looking	back	from	the	21st	century,	is	it	possible	to	say	that	these	trials	were	justified?	At	a	recent	academic	conference,	the	historians	Michael	Vorenberg	and	Paul	Finkelman—neither	of	whom	has	written	extensively	on	these	trials—tried	to	reclaim	the	prosecutors’	standpoint	on	this	question.	As	part	of	Reconstruction,	they	argued,	Confederate	leaders	who	misbehaved	in	the	war	needed	to	be	punished	and	the	procedural	shortcomings	of	the	Wirz	trial	were	insignificant	in	light	of	this	legal	
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and	political	necessity.	237	In	Finkelman’s	words,	“the	tragedy	of	the	postwar	experience”	was	the	failure	to	prosecute	more	Confederate	leaders,	especially	those	who	committed	crimes	against	blacks.238	Vorenberg	and	Finkelman	provided	an	overdue	reaction	to	the	dominant	revisionist	narrative.	They	pointed	out,	for	instance,	that	Wirz	must	be	seen	through	the	lens	of	20th	century	history,	in	particular	the	Nuremberg	trials.	If	the	past	century	has	discredited	the	convention	of	post-war	immunity,	why	should	we	condemn	some	of	the	earliest	legal	actors	for	fighting	against	and	partly	overcoming	it?	Why	should	we	reject	military	commissions	out	of	pocket	if	this	was	the	only	feasible	legal	path	to	prosecute	alleged	war	criminals	at	the	time?	Furthermore,	if	most	historians	today	agree	that	military	Reconstruction	was	necessary	to	defend	rights	for	ex-slaves,	how	can	we	detach	this	necessity	from	the	issue	of	post-war	war	crimes	prosecutions?	In	this	context,	to	emphasize	that	the	state	should	never	violate	civil	liberties	(as	the	Wirz	revisionists	do)	is	to	ignore	that	the	quick	reestablishment	of	civil	liberties	for	former	Confederates—that	is,	the	return	to	a	constitutional	status	quo	and	the	removal	of	military	jurisdiction	in	the	South—signified	the	abandonment	of	emancipation	as	a	political	project.	On	the	other	hand,	Vorenberg	and	Finkelman’s	arguments	only	engage	with	the	legacies	of	Wirz	and	Nuremberg	at	a	surface	level.	Nuremberg	did	not	prove	that,	everywhere,	in	all	post-war	contexts,	it	is	appropriate	to	put	on	war	crimes	tribunals.239	As	Shklar	argues	in	Legalism,	the	sense	and	value	of	such	trials	is	always	context-dependent.	For	the	Nuremberg	trials	specifically	(in	contrast	to	most	political	trials),	Shklar	argued	that	they	were	justified	as	a	way	to	re-establish	liberal	norms	of	law	in	the	vacuum	left	by	National	Socialism.240	One	could	perhaps	re-																																																								237	See	their	talks	at	“A	Just	and	Lasting	Peace:	Ending	the	Civil	War,”	a	2014	conference	in	Washington	D.C.	available	at:	https://www.c-span.org/video/?319092-6/discussion-military-trial-henry-wirz.		238	Finkelman,	"Francis	Lieber,"	2126.	239	Some	scholars	have	even	argued	that	war	crimes	trials	are	generally	ineffective	for	post-war	political	transitions.	See,	e.g.,	Jack	Snyder	and	Leslie	Vinjamuri,	"Trials	and	errors:	Principle	and	pragmatism	in	strategies	of	international	justice,"	
International	security	28,	no.	3	(2004).	240	Shklar,	Legalism,	147-8.	
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purpose	this	argument	to	fit	Reconstruction,	applying	it	to	the	specific	vacuum	left	by	legal	slavery.	One	could	argue,	in	line	with	Vorenberg	and	Finkelman,	that	massacres	of	surrendering	black	troops	were	the	logical	result	of	a	Confederate	system	wherein	black	humanity	was	negated.	On	a	didactic	level,	punishing	these	atrocities	could	have	offered	a	potent	moral	defense	for	Reconstruction.	This	is	an	argument	worthy	of	deeper	investigation.	In	the	limited	frame	of	serving	justice,	one	can	easily	argue	that	those	who	committed	such	crimes	deserved	to	be	punished—or	that,	in	a	deeper	sense,	there	was	no	longer	a	place	for	them	in	U.S.	society.	The	didactic	angle,	however,	remains	speculative.	One	of	the	central	historical	facts	to	contend	with	is	that	despite	the	array	of	anti-black	crimes	committed	and	the	ample	evidence	available	to	prosecutors,	they	seemed	to	consciously	avoid	race,	choosing	instead	the	route	of	crimes	against	whites.241	This	choice	apparently	came	from	a	calculation	about	the	white	voting	population,	whose	political	support	for	Reconstruction	was	indispensible.242	One	must	furthermore	contend	with	the	fact	that,	for	those	trials	which	did	occur,	the	prosecutors	were	often	ineffective	in	driving	home	the	message	they	wished	to	convey.	The	decision	to	prosecute	was	laden	with	risks	and	concessions,	and	in	coming	to	a	historical	judgment,	these	must	be	piled	up	and	weighed	against	all	the	plausible	alternatives.	The	existing	narratives—pro-prosecution,	anti-prosecution—are	attractive	because	they	make	it	easy	to	associate	with	one	side	or	another	of	the	historical	situation,	whereas	for	the	historical	actors	themselves,	the	situation	was	ambiguous	and	wrought	by	conflicting	ethical	commitments.	If	one	aligns	oneself	with	the	prosecutors’	strategy,	one	should	do	so	grudgingly.	If	one	opposes	their	efforts	outright,	this	opposition	must	be	justified	in	light	of	the	unsettling	consequences	of	universal	amnesty	in	the	postbellum	South.																																																									241	That	is,	beyond	the	killing	of	two	black	soldiers	dealt	with	in	the	Champ	Ferguson	trial;	the	charge	of	killing	Moses	Smith,	a	black	POW,	in	the	Gee	trial	(see	supra	note	210);	and	the	issue	of	whipping	in	Wirz.	On	the	charges	against	Ferguson,	a	guerrilla	fighter,	see	Sensing,	Champ	Ferguson,	177.	242	The	prosecutors	themselves	were	radical	in	terms	of	the	racial	politics	of	the	day.	For	example,	“Judge	advocates	[pushed]	for…upending	the	traditional	rules	prohibiting	blacks	from	testifying	against	whites,	or...to	challenge	whites	in	lawsuits.”	Kastenberg,	Law	in	war,	313.	
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APPENDIX	
Note	on	Case	Selection	My	selection	of	cases	to	analyze	is	a	function	of	trying	to	locate	their	position	inside	the	larger	historical	arc	of	war	crimes	law	and,	more	specifically,	to	understand	how	they	transgressed	a	long-standing	convention	of	criminal	immunity	for	commissioned	soldiers—in	other	words,	how	a	precedent	emerged	where	none	was	before.	To	this	end,	I	have	constructed	“war	crimes	trials”	as	a	category.		“Violations	of	the	laws	of	war”	in	contemporary	usage	meant	a	broad	range	of	infractions	ranging	from	the	commonplace	to	the	infamous,	most	of	which	would	not	qualify	as	“war	crimes”	in	the	current	sense	of	the	term.	Out	of	this	broader	pool	of	military	commissions	I	left	out	lower-level	offenders,	including	Confederate	soldiers	below	officer	rank,243	and	pushed	to	the	background	the	Lincoln	assassination	and	acts	of	war	by	guerrillas	or	non-commissioned	fighters.	Wirz,	Pickett,	Mercer,	and	Gee	were	commissioned	belligerents.	Their	commission,	their	license	to	kill,244	made	prosecuting	them	in	civilian	courts	under	regular	criminal	charges	hard	to	imagine.	In	the	assassins’	trial,	it	is	true	that	the	political	aims	of	the	prosecutors—damaging	the	reputation	of	Confederate	leaders—bore	close	similarities	to	Wirz.	But	as	Witt	points	out,	the	assassins	could	have	been	tried	according	to	domestic	criminal	law	without	any	extraordinary	legal	jockeying.245	For	guerrillas	such	as	Champ	Ferguson,	who	was	tried	and	convicted	for	mass	murder	at	roughly	the	same	time	as	Wirz,	the	Confederate	government	did	not	take	credit	for	their	actions.	Their	participation	in	the	war	was	prima	facie	illegal,	thus	the	convention	of	criminal	immunity	did	not	apply	to	them.246																																																									243	This	includes	the	trial	of	James	Duncan,	a	private	stationed	at	Andersonville	prison,	as	well	as	a	host	of	others	that	resulted	in	a	mix	of	convictions	and	acquittals.	On	Duncan,	see	Department,	Official	records,	2.8,	926-8.;	for	a	sample	of	others,	see	United	States	Army,	Military	Trials:	Middle	Department,	1862-1868,	Law,	Library	of	Congress,	363,	462,	65,	543,	73,	683,	1157,	n.p.,	https://lccn.loc.gov/59056960.	244	On	this	“license,”	see	supra	note	89.	245	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	295.	246	This	point	is	complicated	to	some	degree	by	the	Partisan	Ranger	Act	of	1862,	which	many	considered	an	open	endorsement	of	pro-Confederate	guerrilla	warfare.	On	the	act,	which	was	repealed	in	1864,	see	Witt,	Lincoln’s	code,	190.	
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